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THE FALCON CANNOT HEAR THE 
FALCONER: HOW CALIFORNIA’S 
INITIATIVE PROCESS IS CREATING AN 
UNTENABLE CONSTITUTION 
Rudy Klapper∗ 
          Californians have always cherished the idea that ultimate 
political power lies in the people, an idea best represented by the 
state’s hugely influential initiative process. Today, however, that 
initiative power threatens to spiral out of control, thanks in large part 
to the California Supreme Court’s inability to construe appropriate 
limits on it. This has created an unbalanced government where the 
rights of minorities are easily circumscribed and the financial and 
political infrastructure of the state is in danger of buckling under the 
combined weight of dozens of initiatives. This Article argues that the 
judiciary’s haphazard interpretation of various rules and regulations 
regarding the initiative has created a situation where the necessary 
checks and balances in a republican system are in danger of being 
subverted. Furthermore, this Article proposes stricter standards for the 
initiative process and encourages the court to turn a more discerning 
eye onto the wave of initiatives generated each year. Embracing a more 
stringent initiative will preserve the importance of the people’s power 
while still safeguarding the rights of all who call California home. 
∗ J.D., May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S., Music Industry, minor in
Business Law, May 2011, University of Southern California. Enormous thanks to Karl M. 
Manheim, Professor of Law, whose expertise and knowledge was a massive influence and an 
invaluable helping hand along the way, and to my editor Karen Roche, without whose assistance 
and guidance this Article would never have made it to publication. I also want to thank the staff 
and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all their input and work, particularly 
Marleina Paz, Scott Klausner, Robert Shepard, and Cameron Bell. Finally, to my family, who 
made sure I went to law school and stayed there. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
It’s not hard to let it go from a mess to the masses.1 
From California’s first constitutional convention in 1849, 
Californians have cherished the idea that power ultimately lies in the 
people.2 Indeed, the idea of popular sovereignty—that power in the 
government inherently lies with the people it is meant to govern—
has been a key facet of the United States political system since the 
framers of the Federal Constitution first articulated the idea in 1787.3 
That idea of popular sovereignty is also reflected in California’s 
initiative power, which has allowed its people to directly propose 
statutes and amendments to the California Constitution since 1911.4 
Today, however, the people’s initiative power5 threatens to 
spiral out of control. The initiative process and the resulting 
substantial changes it has made to the state constitution have reduced 
the state government to a gridlocked, impoverished entity.6 
Initiatives often worsen the very problems they ostensibly aim to 
fix.7 Indeed, the ideals that the people’s initiative stood for when it 
was created have been transformed; rather than allowing the people 
to fight against controlling elites in government, ballot initiatives 
have become a favored instrument of those same controlling 
interests.8 This threatens to upset the necessary balance between 
direct democracy—a form of government whereby the people, not 
their elected representatives, create the laws and policies9—and the 
1. PHOENIX, LISZTOMANIA, on WOLFGANG AMADEUS PHOENIX (V2 Records 2009).
2. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
3. “We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.” U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Abraham Lincoln, President of the 
United States, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (“[G]overnment of the people, by the people, 
for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”). 
4. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
5. See id.
6. Byron Williams, Voters Have Had a Major Hand in Creating Dysfunctional
Government, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (May 26, 2012), http://www.contracostatimes.com/columns 
/ci_20716383/byron-williams-voters-have-had-major-hand-creating. 
7. Id.
8. The Perils of Extreme Democracy, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2011, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/18586520. 
9. Robert Longley, Direct Democracy, ABOUT.COM, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od
/thepoliticalsystem/a/Direct-Democracy.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2013). 
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system of checks and balances inherent in a republican 
government.10 
California’s initiative system was designed to protect the people 
from the machinations of controlling interests like the Southern 
Pacific Railroad, the dominant corporate power in early 
twentieth-century California.11 The initiative power opened a new 
avenue that allowed proposed legislation to become law, uninhibited 
by controlling corporate views.12 The unhindered growth of the 
initiative process, however, has turned this initial purpose on its 
head, at times harming the people instead of protecting them. Today, 
initiatives are often funded by the same “well-heeled corporate 
interests” that early twentieth-century Progressives would have 
blanched at.13 
The California Supreme Court, whose self-proclaimed role has 
always been to “jealously [guard] the sovereign people’s initiative 
power,”14 has shaped the parameters of the initiative and referendum 
power since the creation of the initiative.15 However, far from 
clarifying the extent and limits of the people’s initiative power, the 
court’s decisions have instead resulted in a hundred years of 
uncertainty.16 Although the court has attempted to be a guiding force 
for California’s ballot initiative process, the court’s loose application 
of various limitations on the initiative has allowed narrow, hastily 
assembled majorities to do as they please.17 This has opened up 
California to the possibility of a pure majoritarian government 
vulnerable to factions and passing fads, one that potentially 
undermines core values of both republican government and the 
California Constitution itself.18 California’s disastrous and ultimately 
10. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
11. Karl M. Manheim, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in California, 31 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (1998).
12. Id.
13. See id. at 1190 (“[T]he insurance industry spent $88 million dollars on California
initiatives in 1988—more than George Bush spent on his entire presidential campaign . . . .”). 
14. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 277 (Cal. 1982).
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See Ray L. Ngo, The Elephant in the Room: A Critique of California’s Constitutional
Amendment Process That Gave Birth to the Baby Elephant (Proposition 8) and a Call For Its 
Reform, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 235, 244–52 (2011). 
17. See Angela Chrysler, Proposition 8 and the Need for California Constitutional
Amendment Initiative Reform: Tolerance Requires Time and Deliberation, 37 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 591, 606 (2010).
18. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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failed flirtation with a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage is just 
one example of an initiative process run amok.”19 
Three vital constitutional limitations on the initiative power 
strive to maintain the balance between direct democracy and 
republicanism: the distinction between a constitutional revision and 
an amendment, the “single-subject” rule, and the legislature’s ability 
to amend an initiative statute.20 However, the California Supreme 
Court’s various and often inconsistent decisions on these limitations 
have failed to preserve the principles these limitations reflect.21 One 
result of these decisions is that the initiative power may subvert the 
California Constitution’s avowed goal of protecting the minority 
from the majority.22 
In an ideal democracy like the one envisioned by the framers of 
the initiative process,  
the freedom of the individual can only be legitimately 
constrained by the State insofar as the State’s action is the 
product of the people’s will . . . Every participant, 
regardless of their own moral viewpoint, must be willing to 
listen to others, to give her opponents’ arguments a 
fair-minded hearing . . . [and] must not fail to respect the 
dignity of her fellow citizens.23  
California’s current system of direct democracy, however, allows a 
bare majority to erode the essence of the California Constitution 
without the opportunity for both sides to be heard.24 Given that 
republicanism’s essential nature is to prevent the “tyranny of the 
majority,”25 this is an untenable position. If both direct democracy 
and republicanism are to have a place in California government,26 
then the distinctions and relationship between the two should be 
19. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
20. See infra Part II.
21. E.g., Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112 (Cal. 1995); Strauss, 207
P.3d 48; Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990); Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274
(Cal. 1982); Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization, 583
P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978); see infra Part II.C.1–3.
22. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
23. Anna Marie Smith, The Paradoxes of Popular Constitutionalism: Proposition 8 and
Strauss v. Horton, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 517, 586–87 (2010). 
24. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
25. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859).
26. It is unlikely that the current initiative system will be changed. See Jim Sanders, Bill to
Stiffen Ballot-Initiative Rules Dies, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 30, 2012, at A4. 
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clearly defined and easily discernible. The power of one should not 
be allowed to overwhelm the other. 
This Article suggests that the judiciary should moderate the 
people’s initiative power so as to correct the imbalance that exists 
between the legislative initiative power and the legislature. Instead of 
enabling an initiative system where a well-funded group can 
campaign for the bare majority needed to take minority rights 
away,27 the court should strive for a system similar to the 
legislature’s, where careful thought and a thorough vetting process 
are required before any hastily assembled proposition is made into 
law. The court should cast aside its preference for isolated technical 
rules and instead look at each initiative on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether it meets or violates the three important principles 
that govern initiatives. It should construe these principles strictly and 
invalidate propositions that violate them. Only by doing this can the 
court restore the proper balance between the people’s legislative 
power and the legislature’s and ensure that the exercise of direct 
democracy will be restricted to its constitutionally mandated 
boundaries. 
Part II discusses the competing theories of republicanism and 
direct democracy and the history leading up to the enactment of the 
California ballot initiative.28 It identifies the structural components of 
the initiative process, examines how the California Supreme Court 
has handled the three limitations on the initiative power, and 
explores how the court’s decisions have shaped the initiative process. 
Part III argues that the court’s haphazard interpretation of the 
people’s initiative power and the various limitations on it have given 
that power a dangerously broad reach. This has directly led to the 
flooding of the political process with initiatives, which in turn has 
promoted the reckless expansion and inefficiency of the California 
state government. Part III also argues that the electorate’s broad 
power to enact fundamental changes, which results from the court’s 
technical formulation of the rules governing initiatives, encroaches 
on California’s system of republicanism and threatens to leave a 
government where the bare majority is in control. Government by a 
bare majority without any consideration or protection for minorities 
27. See infra Part II.C.1.c.
28. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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is a perversion of the republican system California and the United 
States were meant to embody. 
Finally, Part IV proposes that the court should forsake its 
preference for using technical, formalistic rules in isolation and 
instead subject each initiative to a stricter application of the three 
principles governing the initiative system. The court’s approach 
should further the purpose of the overriding constitutional division of 
power between the electorate and the legislature by delineating clear 
and sharp lines between the conflicting ideas of republicanism and 
direct democracy. Additionally, Part IV advises the California 
legislature to attempt to modify the initiative process so as to provide 
a thoughtful approach—one that enhances rather than subverts 
reasoned analysis of an initiative’s effects. This part also suggests 
possible limitations on the people’s initiative power that will 
nevertheless maintain the initiative as the important, powerful tool of 
popular sovereignty it was intended to be. 
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INITIATIVE
No discussion of the people’s initiative power can begin without 
an explanation of the competing theories of republicanism and direct 
democracy and how these two ideals contributed to the founding of 
California and the Progressive movement that birthed the initiative.29 
Since the initiative’s creation in 1911, the California Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of its use and limits has evolved to reflect 
three primary limitations on the initiative’s power: the 
revision-amendment distinction,30 the single-subject rule,31 and the 
legislature’s ability to amend an initiative statute.32 
A. The Conflicting Ideals of Republicanism and Democracy
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were well aware of the
dangers of democracy in its pure or idealized form—namely anarchy 
if the people were allowed to exercise unlimited control.33 As a 
result, they did not provide any mechanism for direct change by the 
29. See infra Part II.A–B.
30. See infra Part II.C.1.
31. See infra Part II.C.2.
32. See infra Part II.C.3.
33. See id.; see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859)
(speaking of the “tyranny of the majority” that greatly influenced the Federalists in the writing of 
the Federal Constitution). 
Spring 2015] CALIFORNIA’S INITIATIVE PROCESS 763 
people, either at the legislative or constitutional levels.34 Instead, 
they advocated for a republic, a form of government in which there is 
an organized scheme of representation to effectuate the people’s 
will.35 This concept of representation via an elected legislative 
body—and a “proper structure”36 that included the tripartite system 
of legislature, executive, and judiciary—was considered necessary to 
achieve a government that could equally balance the various factions 
that composed it.37 In this republican system, every change in the law 
must come from the representatives the people elect, and there is no 
direct method of amending the Constitution.38 This ponderous 
system of checks and balances prevents, or at least restrains, a 
majority from enacting laws contrary to the interests of 
underrepresented factions.39 
Political theorists at the time the Constitution was framed 
frequently warned against John Stuart Mill’s “tyranny of the 
majority,” which they regarded as “among the evils against which 
society requires to be on its guard.”40 It is those everyday factions 
where citizens “united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest”41 must be controlled by republican 
constitutional design.42 Thus, while a controlling majority can be 
34. See U.S. CONST. art V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments . . . [which must be] ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several 
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof . . . .”). 
35. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
36. Id. at 80–81.
37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“It is
of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, 
but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10 at 80–81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that pure 
democracies have often been marked by violence and contention and have generally not lasted as 
long as more stable republican forms of government). 
38. Congress may propose an amendment by a two-thirds majority in both houses, in which
case it must then be ratified by three-quarters of the states via either their legislatures or a 
constitutional convention. Two-thirds of the state legislatures may also propose an amendment by 
calling a constitutional convention, which must then also be ratified by three-quarters of the states 
to pass into law. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
39. See Smith, supra note 23, at 564.
40. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859).
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 123 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books
1987). 
42. See Smith, supra note 23, at 564.
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expected in the course of regular legislative activity,43 the 
Constitution’s rigorous procedures for fundamental change safeguard 
the forms and tenets of government from those majority factions the 
framers feared so much.44 
However, while republicanism triumphed as the form of 
government embodied in the U.S. Constitution, other framers, 
particularly those protective of individual states’ rights, still 
championed a system of direct democracy.45 Thomas Jefferson, 
perhaps the best-known of the Anti-Federalists, wrote that “[t]he 
mass of the citizens is the safest depository of their own rights 
and . . . the evils flowing from the duperies of the people are less 
injurious than those from the egoism of their agents . . . .”46 This 
distrust of government not directly controlled by the populace 
manifested itself in several state governments.47 Jefferson himself 
advocated for a periodic review of the entire constitution rather than 
the difficult amendatory process adopted by the Federalists.48 
Jefferson argued that “no society can make a perpetual constitution,” 
explaining that “[e]very constitution, then, and every law, naturally 
expires. . . . If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of 
right.”49 According to Jefferson, only through greater citizen 
control—via a direct democracy-like system of periodic 
constitutional review—could a state’s governing organ accurately 
reflect the will and changing mores of its people.50 
43. James Madison made a distinction between everyday conditions “in which passions and
factions predominate” and those “great and extraordinary occasions” wherein the people might be 
so moved as to rise up and involve themselves in constitutional lawmaking. THE FEDERALIST NO. 
49, at 314–15 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
44. Id.
45. Smith, supra note 23, at 565.
46. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 668, 672–73 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden 
eds., 1944). 
47. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS 25–26 (1989).
48. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, POLITICAL WRITINGS 596 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball
eds., 1999). 
49. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 23, at 567 (explaining Jefferson’s stance on a form of
direct democracy that used the periodic constitutional convention as an appropriate exercise of 
political power and the difficulty of establishing an acceptable constitution without it). 
50. See Smith, supra note 23, at 567.
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B. Progressivism and the Birth of the Initiative
At the close of the nineteenth century, the government of 
California was hopelessly fractured and inefficient.51 Although the 
Second Constitutional Convention of 1878–79 had resulted in 
numerous reforms aimed at curbing the influence of special interests, 
and prescribed serious restrictions on both legislative and corporate 
power,52 the reforms had little effect.53 In 1880, just a year after the 
Convention concluded, nearly every position of power in the 
California government was tied to the controlling special interest of 
the era, the Southern Pacific Railroad.54 The railroad chose most of 
the state and local candidates for public office, openly sold and 
traded judgeships at will, and was the largest landowner in the 
state.55 The overwhelming corruption and power the Southern Pacific 
exercised over California politics led one commentator to liken the 
state to a “Banana Republic,”56 where no legislation was passed or 
struck down without the omnipotent corporation having a say in it.57 
Having seen few benefits from the 1878–79 constitutional 
convention, Californians experienced profound distrust and 
animosity toward the established legislature as the nineteenth century 
drew to a close.58 Many found inspiration in the Progressive 
movement, which played a fundamental role in shaping the 
governments of many Western states.59 Its adherents believed that 
direct democracy could be beneficial in eradicating widespread 
51. See Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the
Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 
29–30 (1997). 
52. 
Among the significant transformations of power was the establishment of “home rule” 
for California cities. This reform sought to decentralize power in the mistrusted state 
government by guaranteeing local autonomy . . . . [C]ontrolling the railroad 
corporations “was undoubtedly one of the major purposes for which the constitutional 
convention was called.” 
Manheim, supra note 11, at 1183 (quoting CARL BRENT SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL 
TECHNIQUE IN THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1878–79, 112 (New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1969)). 
53. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1184.
54. “Scarcely a vote was cast in either house that did not show some aspect of Southern
Pacific ownership, petty vengeance, or legislative blackmail.” GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE 
CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES 63 (1951). 
55. See id. at 11–13.
56. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1185.
57. MOWRY, supra note 54, at 63.
58. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1185–86.
59. See Persily, supra note 51, at 15, 20.
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dishonesty in government.60 They pointed to the American tradition 
of town hall meetings and the success of the Swiss canton system 
abroad.61 As one writer made clear, the type of crooked government 
the Progressives rallied against fit the Southern Pacific “Banana 
Republic” of California to the letter: 
[T]here has arisen in our midst in recent years a powerful
plutocracy composed of the great public-service
magnates . . . who have succeeded in placing in positions of
leadership political bosses that are susceptible to the
influence of corrupt wealth. . . . [T]he government has
become largely a government of privileged wealth, for
privileged interests, by the lawlessness of the privileged
ones and their tools, with the result that the people are
continually exploited and corruption is steadily spreading
throughout all the ramifications of political life.62
These ideals found root in the merchant middle class of
Southern California and a leadership of conservative Republican 
professionals.63 As a direct result of the state’s corruption and the 
inability of the legislature to extricate itself from corporate control, 
this group would spearhead the reform movement that eventually led 
to the election of Republican governor Hiram Johnson and a number 
of other Progressive legislators in 1910.64 Johnson in turn called a 
special election “to fulfill his promise that powerful private interests 
would never again dominate state government.”65 The ballot 
initiative was one of several successful amendments to the California 
Constitution as a result of that special election.66 California became 
one of the first states to enable lawmaking by initiative.67 The 1911 
ballot pamphlet informing voters of the initiative laid out—in plain, 
60. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1186.
61. Persily, supra note 51, at 15.
62. FRANK PARSONS ET AL., A PRIMER OF DIRECT-LEGISLATION 7 (1906) (reprinted from
THE ARENA, May, June, and July 1906). 
63. MOWRY, supra note 54, at 22.
64. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1186–87.
65. Id. at 1187.
66. Others passed in that election included the powers of referendum and recall. See The
Vote on Amendments No’s 4, 7, 8, 16 in the State, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 11, 1911, at 
A1. 
67. Only South Dakota (1898), Utah (1900), and Oregon (1902) preceded California in
allowing the initiative. See Persily, supra note 51, at 16. 
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convincing terms—its promoters’ goal of reasserting the people’s 
will: 
It is not intended and will not be a substitute for legislation, 
but will constitute that safeguard which the people should 
retain for themselves to supplement the work of the 
legislature by initiating those measures which the 
legislature either viciously or negligently fails or refuses to 
enact; and to hold the legislature in check, and to veto or 
negative such measures as it may viciously or negligently 
enact.68 
The Progressive ideals championed by Governor Johnson and 
his Republican supporters during the initiative campaign emphasized 
the “popular skepticism and restlessness with established authorities” 
that had been a hallmark of California politics since its founding.69 
They also offered strong, convincing arguments for direct democracy 
in the wake of a republican system of government that had become 
hopelessly and openly crooked.70 
Thus, it would seem that Thomas Jefferson’s idea—that the 
constitution should be an organ flexible to the changing needs of 
those it governs—is in accordance with California’s system of 
amendment by ballot initiative.71 However, Jefferson believed that 
such flexible review and change to the Constitution should apply to 
the organ as a whole.72 Jefferson preferred “an integrative approach 
in which the whole document can be voted down in favor of an 
entirely different draft,” not one in which a single issue such as 
same-sex marriage is placed on its own before the electorate.73 
Jefferson’s approach would allow such an issue, proposed as part of 
a larger constitutional convention, to be entertained and debated by 
both its proponents and its opponents—the former would be allowed 
to present justifications, while the latter would no doubt point out 
that the amendment would violate an essential principle like equal 
68. OFF. OF CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, SPECIAL ELECTION VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE:
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NUMBER 22 (1911) (providing statements by State Senator for 
the 34th District Lee C. Gates and Assemblyman for the 59th District William C. Clark). 
69. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1174.
70. Id. at 1187.
71. See Smith, supra note 23, at 568.
72. THOMAS JEFFERSON, POLITICAL WRITINGS 596 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds.,
1999). 
73. Smith, supra note 23, at 568.
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protection.74 Indeed, Jefferson’s idea of a periodic constitutional 
convention more resembles the measured debate and deliberative 
thinking that characterizes regular legislative activity and not the 
simplistic mechanism of initiatives.75 Jefferson would surely see the 
difference between his system of a constitutional convention 
reflecting “historical developments, empirical experience, and 
improvements in knowledge” and a process as exceedingly casual as 
California’s amendment by initiative.76 
Despite the inconsistencies between the Jeffersonian philosophy 
and the Progressive movement, the Progressives nonetheless strongly 
believed in the Jeffersonian ideal that the common man could be 
rationally involved in successful self-government.77 They argued that 
individual factions could not dominate the community because the 
different individuals constituting the community created a body 
where “[n]o one selfish interest is powerful enough to overcome all 
the others; they must wear each other away until general welfare, 
according to the views of the majority acting, is substituted for the 
individual selfish interest.”78 The Progressives idealistically believed 
that this would prevent “hasty or unwise community action,” trusting 
that  
no individual will ever vote for, or willingly assent to, a 
change, unless satisfied that that change will directly benefit 
him individually, or that the action will bring improved 
general welfare to the community. . . . [C]ommunity action 
determines the average of individual interests, and secures 
the greatest good for the greatest number.79 
The Progressives wholeheartedly believed that the initiative 
power provided the best tool available for reaching their goal of a 
government free of corruption and open to the common man.80 Not 
74. Id.
75. See id. at 569.
76. Id. at 568.
77. See Persily, supra note 51, at 27–28; see also Chrysler, supra note 17, at 599 (“We find
that happiness, enlightment [sic] and propserty [sic] among the people increase in precisely the 
same ration [sic] as do their power, influence, and participation in government.” (quoting John 
Randolph Haynes, an early twentieth-century California Progressive)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
78. Jonathan Bourne, Functions of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, 43 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 3, 11 (1912). 
79. Id. at 12.
80. See Persily, supra note 51, at 28.
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until the initiative was codified and the California Supreme Court 
began to shape the contours of its power did it become clear that this 
ease of changing the constitution created multiple new challenges for 
the state.81 To understand how this occurred, it is necessary to first 
examine the initiative process itself. 
C. Procedure of the Initiative
To begin the initiative process, sponsors write a petition 
containing the text of the proposed statute or constitutional 
amendment and send it to the Secretary of State82 of California.83 
The attorney general then writes an impartial title84 and summary for 
inclusion on the petitions that are circulated to citizens.85 That 
petition must be certified as signed by citizens eligible to vote in 
California, in a number equal to 5 percent (for a statute) or 8 percent 
(for an amendment) of the votes for all candidates for governor at the 
most recent election.86 If the requisite number of signatures is 
collected, the Secretary of State then submits the measure to the 
voters at the next general election, at least 131 days after the 
initiative has qualified.87 Following that, proponents and opponents 
of a ballot measure provide arguments favoring or opposing the 
initiative.88 Although these arguments cannot ordinarily be checked 
for accuracy or altered, a challenger may petition a court to order 
changes in an argument’s language.89 
81. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1188.
82. At the local level, the petition is sent to the City or Country Clerk. TRACY M. GORDON,
PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, THE LOCAL INITIATIVE IN CALIFORNIA 9 (2004), 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_904TGR.pdf. 
83. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEWIDE INITIATIVE GUIDE 1 (2011), http://www.sos.ca.gov
/elections/ballot-measures/pdf/initiative-guide.pdf. 
84. There have been a number of lawsuits challenging just how impartial or accurate these
attorney general titles and summaries actually are. See John Diaz, Loading the Ballot Language, 
SFGATE, Jan. 29, 2012, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/diaz/article/Loading-the-ballot-language 
-2759736.php#page-1. Partisan attorney generals have been known to be selective in their
descriptions and use loaded language to sway voters one way or another. Id.
85. Id.
86. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).
87. Id. § 8(c).
88. About Ballot Arguments, SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION 
GUIDE, http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/voter-info/about-ballot-arguments.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 
2013). 
89. Id.
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Furthermore, a proposed initiative may not encompass more 
than one subject—the “single-subject” rule.90 An initiative also may 
not exempt a district from its effects based upon either the measure’s 
approval or rejection or the percentage of votes cast in the district. 
Nor may an initiative contain any alternative provisions which would 
become law “depending upon the casting of a specified percentage of 
votes for or against the measure.”91 No individual may be named to 
office via an initiative, nor may a private corporation be named to 
perform any function or duty.92 Finally, an initiative may only amend 
the constitution, not propose revisions to it.93 This Article focuses 
only on the two main constitutional restrictions on the initiative—the 
single-subject rule and the revision-amendment distinction—as well 
as the legislature’s limited ability to amend an initiative statute. 
D. Structure of the Initiative
From its days as an idealistic tool of the Progressive movement, 
the ballot initiative has grown into a force to be reckoned with in 
California politics.94 Since its inception, a total of 1,759 initiatives 
have been proposed for the California ballot, and 360 of them have 
been submitted to the voters.95 Counting both legislative and 
initiative amendments, the court in Strauss noted that the California 
Constitution has been amended more than 500 times since 1879.96 At 
one point, the California Constitution had ballooned to 95,000 words, 
making it one of the largest governing instruments in the world, 
although it has been trimmed somewhat since then.97 In contrast, the 
U.S. Constitution consists of only 7,818 words and has been 
amended only sixteen times since the Bill of Rights in 1791.98 
90. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
91. Id. §§ 8(e)–(f).
92. Id. § 12.
93. Id. art. XVIII, § 3.
94. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1190 (“[The initiative] is the driving force in California
politics and lawmaking.”). 
95. History of California Initiatives: Initiative Totals by Year, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF 
STATE DEBRA BOWEN, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/history-initiatives-info 
.htm (follow “Initiative Totals by Year” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 19, 2012). 
96. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60 (2009).
97. Pat Ooley, State Governance: An Overview of the History of Constitutional Provisions
Dealing with State Governance, in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMITTEE, 
CONSTITUTION REVISION HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE 3, 6 (1996), http://www 
.californiacityfinance.com/CCRChistory.pdf. 
98. Id.
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Nowadays, the transformation of the initiative process from a 
tool to curb special interests and ensconced, unscrupulous politicians 
to a preferred tool of those same special interests and politicians and 
has led it to become something Governor Hiram Johnson would 
barely recognize.99 Initiatives, long considered the primary tool of 
grassroots organizations striving for change against established 
powers, are now commonly used by “well-heeled special interests” 
to push for favorable change in state law.100 Indeed, even the 
Southern Pacific Railroad contributed $500,000 to an environmental 
bond initiative in the hopes of receiving some of the bond funds to 
upgrade its own tracks with public money.101 Attempts to stiffen the 
requirements of the initiative power to make it more difficult to 
amend the state constitution, such as by increasing the number of 
voter signatures required, have failed.102 Given how dominant and 
widespread the initiative process has become in California politics, it 
seems that the initiative as a powerful, driving legislative force is 
here to stay.103 
1. The Revision-Amendment Distinction
Even before the birth of the initiative power, courts long held 
that the electorate could only amend the constitution, not effect a 
revision to it.104 Revisions were considered such fundamental 
changes to the constitution that they were only proper in the setting 
of a constitutional convention called by the people.105 Over the 
course of the century since the initiative power granted the people 
direct lawmaking power, courts have refined the distinction between 
what constitutes a revision and what constitutes an amendment.106 
99. Peter Schrag, Take the Initiative, Please: Referendum Madness in California, THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Dec. 19, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/tak-initiative-please 
-referendum-madness-california.
100. Initiatives: Use and Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, at M4.
101. Schrag, supra note 99.
102. Sanders, supra note 26.
103. Id.
104. See Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 425–26 (Cal. 1894).
105. Id.
106. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009); Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077
(Cal. 1990); Amador v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978); McFadden v. 
Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948). 
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a. Revision and amendment defined
California is one of many states with a dual-function 
constitution—one both fundamental (or “constitutive”) and 
legislative.107 Provisions deemed fundamental deal “with the frame 
of and declaring the general principles of the republican form of 
government.”108 A change to such a fundamental provision is known 
as a revision.109 The revision process is “purposefully cumbersome to 
implement”110 and requires calling a constitutional convention.111 In 
contrast, the legislative function deals with “the law of the state”112 
and encompasses all matters that a legislature and electorate 
normally pass. The majority of the California Constitution’s 95,000 
words fall under this heading and include regular legislature activity 
as well as an unusually substantial number of initiative language, 
ranging from tax codes to education funding to rate regulation—the 
“everyday operations” of lawmakers.113 Changes to such legislative 
provisions may be considered “amendments.”114 As noted above, the 
initiative power is confined to the adoption of statutes and 
constitutional amendments only.115 
The California Supreme Court first clarified the distinction 
between a revision and an amendment in Livermore v. Waite,116 over 
a decade before the initiative power was written into the California 
Constitution. The court described the difference between a 
constitutional revision and an amendment passed by the legislature 
thus: 
The legislature is not authorized to assume the function of a 
constitutional convention, and propose for adoption by the 
people a revision of the entire constitution under the form of 
an amendment . . . . The very term “constitution” implies an 
instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the 
provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will 
107. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1220.
108. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. Los Angeles County, 132 P. 282, 283 (Cal. 1913).
109. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1221–22.
110. Id. at 1221.
111. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
112. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 132 P. at 283.
113. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1221–22.
114. Id.
115. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
116. 36 P. 424 (Cal. 1894).
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of the people that the underlying principles upon which it 
rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, 
shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the 
other hand, the significance of the term “amendment” 
implies such an addition or change within the lines of the 
original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better 
carry out the purpose for which it was framed . . . [and] the 
changed condition of affairs . . . or the changes of society or 
time, may demand an enlargement of some of these 
limitations, or an extended application of its principles.117 
It was not until decades later that the court held the same 
distinction set forth in Livermore applied not only to ballot matters 
put forward by the legislature but also to initiatives.118 The Great 
Depression and the resulting turmoil it brought to California gave 
rise to the “ham-and-eggs” initiatives of the late 1930s and 1940s, a 
movement ostensibly tailored to fighting for the rights of the 
elderly.119 The most famous of these initiatives was a 21,000-word 
behemoth entitled the “California Bill of Rights” that the California 
Supreme Court removed from the ballot in McFadden v. Jordan, 
three months before the election.120 The ballot measure at issue in 
McFadden was a prime example of an initiative that affected the 
“substantial entirety” of the constitution and a wide variety of 
functions, and thus was not an acceptable use of the initiative 
power.121 Given that the initiative contained 208 sections and 
repealed or altered fifteen of twenty-five existing articles, it was not 
surprising that the court held the initiative effected “such extensive 
alterations in the basic plan and substance of our present 
Constitution” as to constitute an improper revision to it.122  
117. Id. at 426.
118. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
119. For an illuminating look at the history and trends that contributed to the rise of the
“ham-and-eggs” movement see R. Michael Alvarez et. al., The “Ham and Eggs” Movement in 
Southern California: Public Opinion on Economic Redistribution in the 1938 Campaign (Ctr. for 
the Study of Law and Politics, Working Paper No. 12, 2003), available at http://lawweb 
.usc.edu/centers/cslp/assets/docs/cslp-wp-012.pdf. 
120. 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
121. Id. at 797.
122. Id.
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b. The two-pronged modern revision-amendment analysis
The modern analysis of the revision-amendment distinction was
set forth with clarity thirty years after McFadden in Amador Valley 
Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization.123 
To provide a more helpful roadmap to determine whether a particular 
constitutional enactment is a revision or an amendment, the 
California Supreme Court in that case developed a two-part analysis 
that looked to both the quantitative and qualitative effects of the 
proposition.124 An initiative that is “so extensive in its provisions as 
to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the Constitution by the 
deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions” constitutes a 
quantitative revision.125 The initiative in McFadden is a textbook 
case of a proposition that effects such wholesale change to the 
constitution as to be a quantitative revision under the Amador 
standard.126 
A qualitative enactment may also prove to be unconstitutional, 
assuming it “accomplish[es] such far reaching changes in the nature 
of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.”127 A 
change from republican governance to direct democracy, or a 
measure preventing local governments from controlling their own 
affairs or finances free of interference by the state legislature, would 
be an example of an impermissible qualitative revision.128 These 
types of fundamental changes to government structure, or 
impingements on essential constitutional rights, could only be 
effected through the political power of a constitutional convention, 
not by an initiative.129 
Consider the case of Proposition 13, a 1978 initiative that’s main 
purpose was to require a two-thirds legislative majority for the 
passage of any new tax.130 The court found that, despite the 
considerable changes the proposition wrought in the area of taxation, 
the changes functioned narrowly enough to institute a new method of 
taxation and held that such a limited purpose was well within the 
123. 583 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Cal. 1978).
124. Id. at 1286.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1287.
129. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1226.
130. Amador, 583 P.2d, at 1284.
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bounds of the people’s initiative power.131 The proposition only 
affected one article of the constitution and thus was not a quantitative 
revision.132 Furthermore, despite Proposition 13’s substantial change 
to the state’s entire taxation mechanism and the new requirement of a 
two-thirds vote for future tax changes, the court held that the 
qualitative effect was neither substantial nor novel enough to 
constitute a full-scale qualitative revision.133 
In its decision, the court spoke glowingly of its mission to 
“liberally construe[] [the initiative power] to promote the democratic 
process,”134 emphasizing that the role of the initiative was to act as a 
“legislative battering ram” which may be used to cut through normal 
legislative red tape and “strike directly toward the desired end.”135 
Despite the court’s downplaying the effect of Proposition 13, 
however, the initiative severely hurt the ability of local governments 
to tax and manage their own revenues, transferring much of that role 
to the state government.136 In essence, Amador stated that it was 
acceptable for an initiative to uphold “fairly dramatic alterations in 
the distribution of powers.”137 Nevertheless, even these dramatic 
alterations were viewed as operating merely “within a relatively 
narrow range to accomplish a new system of taxation”—certainly a 
novel change, but not a prohibitively substantial one in the court’s 
eyes.138 
Aside from McFadden, the only other time the court has struck 
down a proposition for constituting an impermissible revision was in 
Raven v. Deukmejian.139 The proposition at issue in that case, 
Proposition 115, was known as the “Crime Victims Justice Reform 
Act” and consisted of numerous comprehensive reforms ostensibly 
related to the criminal justice system.140 One such change qualified 
131. Id. at 1289.
132. Id. at 1286.
133. Id. at 1289.
134. Id. at 1283.
135. Id. at 1289.
136. The two-thirds vote requirement Proposition 13 instituted for the passage of any new
taxes created “an insurmountable obstacle built on populist allergy to any kind of new levy.” 
Kevin O’Leary, The Legacy of Proposition 13, TIME, June 27, 2009, http://www.time.com/time 
/nation/article/0,8599,1904938,00.html. 
137. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1226.
138. Amador v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1289 (Cal. 1978).
139. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
140. Id. at 1079.
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Article I, Section 24141 by stating that specific criminal procedural 
rights in the state constitution “shall be construed by the courts of 
this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United 
States.”142 The intended effect was to prevent California courts from 
interpreting the state constitution as granting criminal defendants 
more expansive rights than they enjoyed under the federal 
Constitution.143 The court found that this single change was an illegal 
revision under the qualitative Amador prong.144 
While the Amador court approved Proposition 13’s profound 
alteration of California’s taxation systems,145 it jealously guarded its 
own independent interpretive powers in Raven, calling Proposition 
115’s effect on that power “devastating.”146 It explained that 
Proposition 115 would “severely limit[] the independent force and 
effect of the California Constitution”147 such as to “substantially 
change our preexisting governmental framework”;148 that is, effect a 
qualitative revision. It seems that the court’s own independent 
interpretative power is not to be disturbed, despite the fact that 
deferring to the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting state 
constitutional language that is similar to federal constitutional 
language is nothing new.149 This is especially interesting in light of 
141. “Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. 
142. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086.
143. Id. at 1087. By the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court had started to substantially curtail the
constitutional rights developed by the Warren Court. Interview with Karl M. Manheim, Professor, 
Loyola Law Sch., in L.A., Cal. (Jan. 24, 2013). Many state courts began resorting to state 
constitutional rights as a way to preserve the status quo. Id. Proposition 115 was one such 
example, an initiative designed to stop a practice of more expansive criminal rights. Id. Another 
technique involved strong and often virulent attacks against sitting justices on the state supreme 
court, which is what happened to Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other associate justices in 
1986. Larry D. Hatfield, Ex-Chief Justice Rose Bird Dies, SFGATE, Dec. 5, 1999, http://www 
.sfgate.com/news/article/Ex-Chief-Justice-Rose-Bird-dies-3055490.php#page-1. The campaign 
was a direct result of the justices’ stance against the death penalty. Id. Seen against this backdrop, 
Raven v. Deukmejian can be seen as the California Supreme Court striking back. Interview with 
Karl M. Manheim, Professor, Loyola Law Sch., in L.A., Cal. (Jan. 24, 2013). 
144. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1087–88.
145. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281,
1289 (Cal. 1978). 
146. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1087.
147. Id. at 1088.
148. Id. at 1086.
149. Id. at 1088.
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the court’s previous acceptance of initiatives that constricted the 
judiciary’s power.150 
c. Narrowing of the qualitative prong
Strauss v. Horton151 narrowed what it meant for an initiative to 
work a revision under the qualitative prong.152 Proposition 8, at issue 
in Strauss, was a voter initiative that arose as a response to the 
court’s holding in In re Marriage Cases153 that same-sex couples 
enjoyed the same fundamental right to marry, under the state 
constitution, as did opposite-sex couples.154 Accordingly, to overrule 
that case, opponents of same-sex marriage had to remove that 
constitutional protection.155 Proposition 8 did just that, adding the 
following section to the California Constitution: “Only marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”156 
Opponents of Proposition 8 raised the issue that the initiative 
constituted an impermissible revision of the constitution, as it 
abridged a right that the court had just declared fundamental under 
the privacy and due process rights of the constitution.157 The court, 
however, disagreed, holding that a change to the constitution can 
only be considered a qualitative revision when it affects 
governmental organization and structure and not when the change is 
one that affects a fundamental principle of social organization like 
equal protection.158 
As it stands now, the court’s technical approach to 
distinguishing between what constitutes a permissible amendment 
and what constitutes an impermissible revision allows for the 
150. See In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985); People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587 (Cal.
1979). In re Lance W. challenged the 1982 Proposition 8 restriction of the judicially created 
exclusionary rule as an improper revision, but the court held it to be a mere amendment and in 
doing so implicitly authorized the people to prescribe rules of procedure and of evidence. 694 
P.2d at 752. The initiative at issue in People v. Frierson added a provision to the California
Constitution declaring the death penalty not to be cruel or unusual punishment—preventing the
judiciary from interpreting the cruel and unusual standard itself—and was said to be an
amendment, not a revision. 599 P.2d at 613–14. However, only three justices signed the lead
opinion on the case. Id.
151. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
152. Id. at 114.
153. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
154. Id. at 385.
155. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 59.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 127 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
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removal of a fundamental constitutional right (even one recently 
classified as such by the same court) from a minority group by a 
majority vote.159 In other words, the very idea of protecting minority 
rights from majority impairment is subject to majority rule.160 The 
court has not hesitated, however, to strike down an amendment that 
attempts to reduce the court’s own powers, like independent judicial 
review, as an impermissible modification of government structure or 
organization.161 Presently, the court’s formalistic analysis of the 
revision-amendment distinction does not follow the same spirit as the 
constitutional safeguards first put in place by California’s 
founders.162 
2. The “Single-Subject” Rule
The single-subject rule prevents an initiative from being 
submitted to voters if it covers more than one issue.163 The rule was 
designed to prevent overly complex measures from confusing the 
electorate, whether through deceptive ballot descriptions or the sheer 
amount of text often present within an initiative.164 However, the 
California Supreme Court’s lax treatment of the single-subject rule 
over the years has made the rule a virtually toothless restriction.165 
As it stands today, the single-subject rule remains a toothless bar to 
the passage of an initiative.166 
159. Ngo, supra note 16, at 247.
160. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
161. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087 (Cal. 1990).
162. “[G]overnment was instituted for the protection of minorities [and] [t]he majority of any
community . . . [is] to be restrained from infringing upon the rights of the minority.” J. ROSS 
BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION 
OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849 22 (1850) (statement by 
delegate William Gwin in an effort to involve the minority populations in the drafting of a state 
constitution). “The drafters of our Constitution never imagined, nor would they have approved, a 
rule that gives the foundational principles of social organization in free societies, such as equal 
protection, less protection from hasty, unconsidered change than principles of governmental 
organization.” Strauss, 207 P.3d at 124 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
163. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
164. Marilyn E. Minger, Putting the “Single” Back in the Single-Subject Rule: A Proposal for
Initiative Reform in California, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 879, 879–80 (1991). 
165. Id. at 880.
166. Gerald F. Uelmen, Review of Initiatives by the California Supreme Court, 2000–2010,
44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 659, 661 (2011). 
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a. Creation and purpose of the single-subject rule
Article II, Section 8(d) of the California Constitution holds that 
“[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be 
submitted to the electors or have any effect.”167 The bloated 
proposition at issue in McFadden led directly to the passage of this 
amendment.168 The idea of a single-subject rule, however, was not 
new169 and had been a part of the legislature’s lawmaking process for 
decades.170 The single-subject rule was intended to eliminate “the 
possibility of such confusion inasmuch as it will limit each proposed 
amendment to one subject and one subject only.”171 Indeed, the 
single-subject rule has long attempted to accomplish two goals: (1) 
reducing voter confusion;172 and (2) preventing two or more 
dissimilar measures from being combined into a single act to 
facilitate its passage through a governing body that might otherwise 
more carefully scrutinize the separate provisions.173 Without 
stringent enforcement of a single-subject rule, courts must instead 
assume that voters understand all the various complexities and 
effects of a ballot measure.174 
b. The reasonably germane test:
A broad application of the single-subject rule 
The court’s first opinion applying the single-subject rule set the 
tone for how it would interpret the rule for the next sixty years: as 
167. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
168. The California Supreme Court decided McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948),
on August 3, 1948. The ballot measure adding the single-subject rule to the constitution was 
approved on March 26, 1948. See id. for a discussion of the initiative. 
169. Consider the Roman law Lex Caecilia Didia, which first prohibited lex satura, or laws
containing unrelated provisions, in 98 B.C. Kurt G Kastorf, Logrolling Gets Logrolled: Same-Sex 
Marriage, Direct Democracy, and the Single-Subject Rule, 54 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1640 (2005). 
The first American single-subject rule came about in 1844 in New Jersey and soon became a 
fixture in many other states. See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7 para. 4; Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall 
Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REV. 389, 389–90 (1958). 
170. See CAL. CONST. art IV, § 9. There is, however, one important difference between the
two rules in that the legislature must state the subject in the title of a bill, whereas an initiative 
does not have such a requirement. Compare CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9 with CAL. CONST. art. II, 
§ 8 (highlighting that while the legislature must state the subject in the title of a bill, an initiative
does not have such a requirement).
171. Id.
172. A “mismatch between voters’ perception of what an initiative does and that measure’s
actual effect.” Kastorf, supra note 169, at 1641. 
173. This practice is known as “logrolling.” See id.
174. Uelmen, supra note 166, at 662.
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broadly and as expansively as possible.175 The court in Perry v. 
Jordan held that  
[p]rovisions governing projects so related and
interdependent as to constitute a single scheme may be
properly included within a single act . . . [and] [t]he
Legislature may insert in a single act all legislation germane
to the general subject as expressed in its title and within the
field of legislation suggested thereby.176
This language is known as the “reasonably germane” requirement 
and was borrowed from an interpretation of the legislative single-
subject rule.177 The “reasonably germane” test is the guidepost for all 
of the court’s subsequent decisions regarding the initiative single-
subject rule.178 
The court showed just how relaxed a “general subject” could be 
in Brosnahan v. Brown.179 The proposition at issue in that case, also 
called Proposition 8,180 was a multifaceted criminal justice reform 
measure aimed specifically at strengthening and bolstering the rights 
of those affected by crime.181 While much of the proposition dealt 
with victims’ rights, bail, diminished capacity, truth-in-evidence, 
prior convictions, plea bargaining, and other such 
“criminal justice”-related provisions, section 28, subdivision (c) 
declared the “inalienable right [of public school students and staff] to 
attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful.”182 Petitioners 
in the case argued that such a right is an “undefined, amorphous 
concept,” which was not sufficiently tethered to the idea of criminal 
justice reform to fall within the single-subject of the proposition.183 
The court, however, disagreed.184 Upholding the “reasonably 
germane” standard articulated in Perry, the court held that 
175. Perry v. Jordan, 207 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1949) (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. Evans v. Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (Cal. 1932).
178. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1208.
179. 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982).
180. Not to be confused with the Proposition 8 later at issue in Strauss. See Strauss v. Horton,
207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
181. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 280.
182. Id. at 278.
183. Petitioners noted that the right to safe schools is one that could fall under any number of
divergent hazards from acts of nature and acts of war to more mundane ones like building code 
violations. Id. at 280. 
184. Id. at 281.
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Proposition 8’s safe-schools provision sufficiently “aimed at, and 
[was] limited to[] the single subject of safety from criminal 
behavior.”185 The court noted that its own precedent on the issue had 
painted the single-subject rule in broad swaths,186 and to construe the 
single-subject rule any more tightly would contradict the court’s 
stated mission to “avoid an overly strict judicial application of the 
single-subject requirement, . . . frustrat[ing] legitimate efforts by the 
people to accomplish integrated reform measures.”187 Yet the 
purpose of the single-subject rule is to prevent such “integrated 
reform measures” that may constitute logrolling or cause greater 
voter confusion with complex, tenuously related provisions.188 
The past decade has confirmed that the single-subject rule 
remains a virtual nonentity.189 In Manduley v. Superior Court,190 the 
court held that Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile 
Crime Prevention Act of 1998, did not violate the single-subject 
rule.191 Although Proposition 21 ostensibly dealt strictly with gang 
violence and juvenile crime, the measure added a number of 
amendments to the constitution, expanding the “Three Strikes” law 
to include several offenses that were not related to gang violence or 
any other sort of juvenile crime.192 Instead of analyzing whether 
these provisions were in fact reasonably germane to the subject of 
gang violence and juvenile crime, the court noted that the attorney 
general’s summary of Proposition 21 explicitly designated the 
additional crimes as violent and serious felonies, automatically 
making them worthy of longer sentences.193 The court held that no 
voters could have been fooled, fulfilling one of the primary purposes 
of the single-subject rule. Therefore, the court reasoned, all of the 
185. Id.
186. The court specifically recalled its discussion of the legislative single-subject rule in
Evans v. Superior Court. Brosnahan. Id. at 280. There, the court had upheld a measure that 
included a number of disparate subjects including wills, succession details, administration and 
distribution of decedents’ estates, and the roles and procedures of guardianships of minors and 
incompetents and found that they were all reasonably germane to probate law. See Evans v. 
Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467 (Cal. 1932). 
187. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 283 (quoting Amador v. State Board of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281 (Cal. 1978)). 
188. Minger, supra note 164, at 908–09.
189. Id. at 880.
190. 41 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2002).
191. Id. at 9.
192. Uelmen, supra note 166, at 661.
193. Manduley, 41 P.3d at 31.
782 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:755 
provisions were “reasonably germane to the common purpose of 
reducing gang-related and juvenile crime.”194 Justice Moreno 
concurred but noted the obvious problem inherent in the court’s 
analysis of Manduley: simply put, it is unrealistic to assume that 
voters carefully scrutinize their ballot guides and understand the 
measures they are voting on.195 
The single-subject rule remains a lightly regarded rule, one the 
court would prefer to apply broadly for fear of restricting the 
people’s experiment with direct democracy.196 
3. The Legislature’s “Ability” to Amend Initiatives
Unless an initiative expressly provides for it, the California 
legislature may not amend initiative statutes by passing another 
statute.197 California is the only ballot-initiative state that restricts the 
legislature from amending an initiative statute,198 a reminder of just 
how deeply seated California’s distrust of the legislature was when 
the initiative process was first instituted.199 Courts have honored this 
restriction quite deferentially, in a nod to the judicial view that the 
electorate’s power to enact direct legislation is a fundamental right 
that should be left undisturbed by the legislature.200 For practical 
reasons, however, initiative drafters have long permitted the 
legislature to amend an initiative if the amendment “furthers” the 
initiative’s “purposes.”201 The traditional rationale is that it is more 
efficient to allow the legislature to provide technical fixes to 
amendments than to hold another inconvenient, expensive election 
just to amend a poorly worded statute.202 
What exactly constitutes a statute that “furthers the purpose” of 
an initiative amendment? In Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. 
Wilson,203 the court had to answer this question to determine whether 
194. Id. at 33.
195. Id. at 38–39 (Moreno, J., concurring).
196. Minger, supra note 164, at 880.
197. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c).
198. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1197.
199. Id.
200. See Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1995) (quoting Associated Home Builders
v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1976)); Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v.
Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 799 P.2d 1220, 1235 (Cal. 1990).
201. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1199.
202. Id.
203. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1120 (Cal. 1995). Proposition 103 essentially
included a cutback of insurance rates to 80 percent of the rate from the year prior to the 
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a legislative amendment to the recently passed Proposition 103 
actually “furthered the purpose” of the initiative’s stated goal of 
insurance reform. The court held that the limitation that the 
legislature’s statutory amendment to the initiative must further its 
purpose necessarily requires a heightened level of judicial review, 
lest the legislature be able to subvert the entire process by weakening 
initiative statutes once they are enacted.204 The court also noted in 
dicta that a heightened review was necessary to prevent future 
initiative drafters from feeling compelled to remove the legislature’s 
ability to amend the initiative entirely.205 The court explained that 
while the legislative power is generally absolute, it is diminished 
where the constitution has established limitations upon that power.206 
Such restrictions must be strictly construed.207 Under a heightened 
review, the court quickly shot down Amwest’s argument that the 
amendment, by clarifying whether the proposition applied to surety 
insurance, did, indeed, further the initiative’s purpose; instead, the 
court concluded, the legislature had “altered its terms in a significant 
respect.”208 
By applying a heightened standard of review to the question of 
whether the legislature’s statutory amendment was permissible, the 
judiciary essentially second-guessed the legislature’s policy 
judgment.209 Furthermore, by setting strict limits on the legislature’s 
ability to amend initiatives, the court unequivocally held that the 
electorate’s legislative power is superior to that of the legislature.210 
This has been expressly noted by the California Supreme Court.211 
The partiality to the people’s direct power may be a result of the fact 
that direct legislation is the closest the people can get to 
self-governance, whereas the political power in Article II, Section 1 
initiative’s passage. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861.01, 1861.05 (West 2012). It also instituted a 
strict rate approval system that required a notification to the public of the requested change and 
prohibited any rate that was “excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in 
violation” of the code. Id. § 1861.05. 
204. See Amwest, 906 P.2d at 1112, 1119.
205. Id. at 1119–20.
206. Id. (quoting Martin v. Riley, 123 P.2d 488 (Cal. 1942)).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1123.
209. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1199.
210. Id. at 1202.
211. “The people’s reserved power of initiative is greater than the power of the legislative
body.” Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 574 (1995). 
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of the constitution is merely theoretical self-governance 
accomplished by representatives, not the people directly.212 
III. THE UNCONTROLLABLE INITIATIVE
The California Supreme Court has loosely applied important 
principles governing the initiative power and has been notably 
unsuccessful in reining in the initiative process.213 This has led to an 
electorate power that seems to have very few actual restrictions and 
that sabotages the original purposes of the initiative.214 
Furthermore, if both direct democracy and republicanism have a 
place in California government, then the distinctions and relationship 
between the two should be pronounced and easily discernible. As it 
stands now, they are not.215 Due to the court’s loose refereeing of the 
initiative system, bare voter majorities may do as they please, 
upsetting the balance between direct democracy and the checks-and-
balances system of republican government.216 Unfettered initiative 
power creates a majoritarian direct democracy model that threatens 
to subvert the ideal of a republican government, which is structured 
to protect the rights of all within the government equally, not at the 
expense of one majority-minority faction or another.217 
A. The Court’s Regulation of the Initiative Has Rendered the
Initiative’s Boundaries Practically Nonexistent 
The court’s interpretations of the single-subject rule and the 
revision-amendment distinction are either so broad as to be a virtual 
paper tiger or too formalistic and inflexible to adequately limit the 
scope of the people’s power, as the framers of the initiative process 
intended.218 The court’s strict regulation of the legislature’s power 
under the “to further the purpose” doctrine, furthermore, has created 
a legislature inferior in its power to that of the electorate’s.219 By 
212. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1217.
213. See infra Part II.D.
214. See generally Bourne, supra note 78, at 3 (discussing the six original functions of the
initiative power as described by its creators). 
215. See infra Part III.B.
216. See infra Part III.B.
217. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 606–07.
218. E.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009); Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077
(Cal. 1990); Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982); Amador Valley Joint Union High 
Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978); see infra Part II.C.1–2. 
219. E.g., Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112 (Cal. 1995); see infra Part II.C.3.
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maintaining these antiquated sets of technical definitions, the court 
has sanctioned radical shifts in the distribution of legislative and 
political powers and failed to stay true to the original progressive 
spirit of the initiative.220 
1. The Qualitative Test Was Read So Narrowly in Strauss as to
Defeat the Purpose of Separating a Revision from an Amendment
While the qualitative and quantitative prongs of Amador remain 
a useful tool for determining whether an initiative is a revision or an 
amendment, Strauss unnecessarily narrowed the qualitative test.221 
This has created a shortsighted definition of “revision” and a political 
arena where the initiative power has the authority to abrogate a 
foundational constitutional principle of law.222 The ability of a bare 
majority of a populace to remove a fundamental right previously 
recognized under the constitution’s equal protection clause flies in 
the face of basic republican theory and shows how the court, in 
yielding to the will of the people, has subjected the California 
Constitution to the whims of a majority interest.223 
a. The current distinction between a revision and an
amendment is needlessly technical and shortsighted
By refusing to strictly construe a revision as one that affects a 
fundamental constitutional principle such as equal protection, the 
California Supreme Court is implicitly condoning direct majoritarian 
lawmaking by the electorate without the regular deliberative 
functions that legislative lawmaking allows.224 Bare majorities can 
easily propose and pass legislation without regard to the interests, 
concerns, or needs of others.225 This is direct democracy at its most 
anti-republican—ignoring the common weal in favor of the 
220. See infra Part III.A.4.
221. In short, an initiative may be considered an amendment if it affects a fundamental right
like privacy, due process, or equal protection, but will be voided as an impermissible revision if it 
enacts a far-reaching change to governmental structure. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 102. 
222. Recent Cases, Equal Protection—Same-Sex Marriage—California Supreme Court
Classifies Proposition 8 as “Amendment” Rather than “Revision,” 123 HARV. L. REV. 1516, 
1518 (2010) [hereinafter Equal Protection]. 
223. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58, 123 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed. Penguin
Books 1987). 
224. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 607.
225. Id. at 606.
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majority’s personal viewpoints and biases.226 Even if such legislation 
were construed as merely a narrowly defined, limited exception, as 
the term “marriage” was in Strauss, the approval of such a 
measure—expressly discriminating against one group’s right to use a 
specific term—is a sufficiently harmful mark to impose second-class 
citizenship on that group.227 The court’s approval of Proposition 8 as 
an amendment to the California Constitution sent a loud and clear 
message not only to gay and lesbian Californians, but to all minority 
groups—your rights, no matter how fundamental, may be erased 
from the constitution at the whim of a bare majority of the 
electorate.228 
The court was wrong in Strauss to hold that a bare majority of 
the electorate voting to take away a fundamental right is not a 
revision of the California Constitution.229 The court’s verbal 
gymnastics in the case tried to sidestep the fact that the court had 
held the marriage right to be fundamental months earlier in In re 
Marriage Cases.230 Based on the court’s logic, the equal protection 
clause, long considered a fundamental part of the constitution,231 
would be subject to the whims of legislative action.232 Laws 
depriving Californians of fundamental rights could now be passed on 
the basis of suspect classifications such as race or religion, as Strauss 
did on the basis of sexual orientation.233 
No matter how one defines the right being taken away, the 
court’s narrow definition of “revision”—as applying only to changes 
to a governmental plan or framework—seemed specially designed to 
categorically exempt initiatives like Proposition 8.234 By changing 
226. E-mail from Karl M. Manheim, Professor of Law, Loyola Law Sch., to author (Jan. 25,
2013, 4:44 PM) (on file with author). 
227. Ngo, supra note 16, at 249.
228. Id.; see also ERIC AVILA, POPULAR CULTURE IN THE AGE OF WHITE FLIGHT: FEAR AND 
FANTASY IN SUBURBAN LOS ANGELES 232 (2004) (discussing how the anti-tax initiative 
Proposition 13, which effectively defunded a number of public schools, successfully passed 
partially due to a large number of white parents pulling their kids out of public schools and 
sending them to private schools as a result of desegregated school busing and equalized public 
school funding). 
229. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 49, 122 (Cal. 2009).
230. 183 P.3d 384, 433 (Cal. 2008).
231. “Equal protection principles lie at the core of the California Constitution and have been
embodied in that document from its inception.” Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting). 
232. Brief for Karl M. Manheim as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (Nos. S168047, S168066, S168078). 
233. Id.
234. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 124 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
Spring 2015] CALIFORNIA’S INITIATIVE PROCESS 787 
the court’s earlier description of a qualitative revision from one that 
includes a change in the basic plan of California government to one 
that is a change in the basic plan of California government, Strauss 
imprudently forecloses all other possible ways to effect a revision.235 
Thus, a change to the constitution that does not affect the 
constitution’s structure or framework must, by the court’s inflexible 
and unflinching logic, be an amendment.236 This would still restrict 
laws that change the role of the judiciary, a part of the “constitutional 
scheme or framework” of government, as the proposition struck 
down in Raven did.237 However, it opens other essential 
constitutional principles to almost limitless attack by initiatives.238 
b. The court’s formalistic, rigidly technical approach to
distinguishing permissible constitutional amendments from 
impermissible constitutional revisions subverts 
the goals of the constitution’s drafters 
The drafters of California’s constitution wholeheartedly believed 
that “government was instituted for the protection of minorities [and 
that t]he majority of any community is . . . to be restrained from 
infringing upon the rights of the minority.”239 By applying a 
formalistic, carefully circumscribed definition to the term “revision,” 
however, the court has done more than just “jealously [guarding] the 
sovereign people’s initiative power”;240 it is yielding to the will of 
the majority and subjecting the California Constitution to “the 
turbulency and weakness of unruly passions.”241 As Justice 
Werdegar noted in Strauss: “The drafters of our Constitution never 
imagined, nor would they have approved, a rule that gives the 
foundational principles of social organization in free societies, such 
as equal protection, less protection from hasty, unconsidered change 
than principles of governmental organization.”242 The idea that a 
235. Id. at 125.
236. Id. at 134 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
237. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990).
238. Brief for Karl M. Manheim, supra note 232, at 23–24.
239. BROWNE, supra note 162, at 22 (statement by delegate William Gwin in an effort to
involve the minority populations in the drafting of a state constitution). 
240. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 277 (Cal. 1982).
241. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
242. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 124 (Cal. 2009) (Werdegar, J., concurring). Despite
Justice Werdegar’s conclusion that the initiative could not modify fundamental constitutional 
principles like equal protection, she nevertheless held that Proposition 8 did not affect equal 
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mere majority of voters is enough to subvert a highly regarded, 
implicitly American principle such as equal protection contrasts with 
the basic goals of a constitution, which is meant to carry guarantees 
that every citizen under its laws can count on.243 
The court’s attempt to avoid these issues in Strauss244 
contradicts its prior reasoning in In re Marriage Cases.245 No matter 
how narrow or limited the court may have attempted to construe 
Proposition 8 to be, its cutting away of a fundamental part of full 
equality “strikes at the core of, and thus fundamentally alters, the 
guarantee of equal treatment that has pervaded the California 
Constitution since 1849.”246 Theoretically, a proposition that 
prohibits usage of the term “marriage” by African-Americans or 
Asian-Americans would be within the initiative power, assuming it 
received more than 50 percent of the popular vote.247 Taken to its 
logical conclusion, the court’s ruling in Strauss would enable the 
electorate to restrict the right of assembly or the right to free 
speech—say, banning the protest or criticism of government—of a 
federally protected suspect class like African-Americans.248 In short, 
what Strauss allows is the complete threatening of a minority group’s 
rights, so long as it does not affect the court’s definition of what 
constitutes the “structure” or “governmental plan” of the 
constitution.249 
Strauss is not consistent with the foundational principle of equal 
protection in our government or the deeply rooted American concept 
of allowing an independent judiciary to interpret and enforce the 
protection because restricting access to the term “marriage” was simply “[d]isagreement over a 
single, newly recognized, contested application of a general principle.” Id. at 128. 
243. William N. Eskridge, Foreword: The Marriage Cases—Reversing The Burden of Inertia
in a Pluralist Constitutional Democracy, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1785, 1842 (2009). 
244. By classifying Proposition 8 as a “narrow exception” the court simply reserved the term
marriage for opposite-sex couples and left all the substantive benefits of marriage for same-sex 
couples under a nominal name such as “domestic partnership.” Strauss, 207 P.3d at 63. 
245. Which quite accurately noted that “draw[ing] a distinction between the name for the
official family relationship of opposite-sex couples (marriage) and that for same-sex couples 
(domestic partnership) impinges upon a same-sex couple’s fundamental interest in having their 
family relationship accorded the same respect and dignity enjoyed by an opposite-sex couple. In 
re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 782 (2008). 
246. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 131 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
247. Ngo, supra note 16, at 252.
248. Id. at 248.
249. Id.
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constitution as it affects fundamental freedoms.250 Indeed, it stands in 
stark contrast to Raven, where the court steadfastly protected its own 
judicial power.251 The state judiciary jealously guards its precious 
and private power to interpret the California Constitution as it sees 
fit, unconstrained by federal courts or the initiative process.252 The 
fact that the court did not see a structural constitutional feature like 
equal protection as deserving the same safekeeping it affords itself 
shows a disconcerting disconnect in the court’s reasoning and is an 
inexplicably limited application of the qualitative prong of 
Amador.253 
2. The “Reasonably Germane” Single-Subject Rule
Is No Limitation at All 
Under the current interpretation of the single-subject rule, 
analyzing an initiative has become an increasingly complicated 
calculation for the average voter.254 As the California Supreme Court 
has interpreted it, the “reasonably germane” limitation is no 
limitation at all.255 Far from preventing logrolling or reducing voter 
confusion, this loose application of the single-subject rule has only 
furthered opportunities for logrolling256 and has vastly increased the 
potential for voter confusion.257 
a. The “reasonably germane” standard
has furthered opportunities for logrolling
The court’s lax interpretation of the “reasonably germane” 
standard has made it easier to mislead the electorate about the true, 
full effects of a measure.258 Generally speaking, it is only those few 
people who are intimately involved with a measure who have 
zealously studied it and know how it will likely affect their own 
interests.259 Most voters would not possess such information and 
250. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 455 (Cal. 2008) (Kennard, J., concurring); see Brief
for Karl M. Manheim, supra note 232, at 25. 
251. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990).
252. Id.
253. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 134 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
254. Minger, supra note 164, at 909.
255. See id. at 880.
256. Increasingly complex measures united under a nebulous concept increase the ease of
“burying unpopular riders in complex measures.” Id. at 908. 
257. Id.
258. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 293 (Cal. 1982) (Bird, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 292.
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likely would not have the time or interest necessary to fully inform 
themselves about a measure.260 The single-subject rule was intended 
to clarify the effect of a proposition in comprehensible, concise 
language, yet the court’s acceptance of broad, inchoate terms to 
satisfy the rule has allowed logrolling to continue.261 
By allowing disparate sections to be united under an 
indeterminate, overly general term, the court has undermined one of 
the main goals of the single-subject rule—preventing logrolling262—
and created a number of potential pitfalls.263 There is the potential 
that voters will be oblivious to the total contents of an initiative’s 
separate provisions.264 The combination of numerous provisions, 
often affecting totally different parts of the constitution and effecting 
various, unrelated changes under a nebulous heading, deprives voters 
of their ability to vote independently on the merits of each separate 
section.265 Furthermore, an unconstrained single-subject rule allows 
an initiative to pass because of aggregated minorities who may 
support separate provisions, not a true majority who favor any or all 
of an initiative’s provisions—a populist analogue to the kind of 
logrolling common in the legislature.266 
Increasingly amorphous terms expand a general concept to the 
point where any initiative can comply with the single-subject rule.267 
The attorney general’s description of the proposition at issue in 
Brosnahan noted that the Victims’ Bill of Rights included 
“potential” as well as actual victims of crime—as dissenting Chief 
Justice Bird noted, “‘potential victims’ of crime includes all of us in 
virtually every aspect of our lives.”268 This could lead to an initiative 
that may encompass “hundreds of unconnected statutes, countless 
260. Id.
261. Minger, supra note 164, at 885.
262. Id.
263. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 293 (Bird, J., dissenting).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.; see also STANLEY R. KAMINSKI & ELINOR L. HART, BLOOMBERG BNA, LOG 
ROLLING VERSUS THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE (2012), available at http://www.duanemorris.com 
/articles/static/kaminski_hart_bloombergbna_022812.pdf (describing the process of logrolling in 
the legislature and states’ attempts to deal with the process by legislative single-subject rule. 
Much like the initiative single-subject rule, these restrictions often fail to curtail substantial 
logrolling). 
267. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 296 (Bird, J., dissenting).
268. Id.
Spring 2015] CALIFORNIA’S INITIATIVE PROCESS 791 
rules of court and volumes of judicial decisions, [and] completely 
alter the complex interrelationships of our society.”269 
Indeed, it is entirely possible that some voters in Brosnahan 
intended to favor better protection for victims of crime without 
favoring a repeal of numerous sections of the state’s Evidence Code, 
some of which allowed victims of crime to be subjected to invasive 
cross-examining involving their private lives.270 Instead of placing 
these separate proposals in separate initiatives with their own, clearly 
defined subjects, drafters deprived voters a chance to analyze, 
discuss, and vote on the separate provisions—the exact opposite of 
what the single-subject rule was supposed to accomplish regarding 
logrolling.271 Far from restricting logrolling, California courts 
actually promote its use by accepting umbrella terms such as 
“potential victims” and “criminal justice” as appropriate single-
subject descriptions.272 
While the legislative single-subject rule and the initiative 
single-subject rule are similar in that they both present weak 
obstacles to logrolling efforts,273 they differ as to what happens after 
the bill is created.274 Legislation is constantly and consistently 
amended between introduction and its eventual passage into law, 
whether through careful compromise or extensive deliberation.275 
Initiatives, on the other hand, are campaigned for and voted on, but 
go through no amendatory process and remain virtually the same 
from creation to the ballot box.276 Thus, while both single-subject 
rules appear similar on the surface, the initiative is still far away 
from the realities of legislative lawmaking.277 It would require a 
stricter application of the single-subject rule to bring the initiative 
power in line with the rule’s purpose and provide a counterpart to the 
deliberative process a republican legislature already goes through.278 
269. Id.
270. Id. at 300.
271. Id. at 300–01.
272. Id. at 297.
273. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
274. E-mail from Karl M. Manheim, Professor of law, Loyola Law Sch., to author (Jan. 25,
2013, 17:13 PST) (on file with author); see also infra notes 354–57 and accompanying text 
(discussing other differences between the legislative single-subject rule and the initiative’s 
single-subject rule). 
275. See sources cited supra note 273.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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b. The “reasonably germane” standard has vastly increased
the potential for voter confusion 
The court’s adoption of the broad, “reasonably germane” 
legislative single-subject standard of Evans,279 although not 
surprising,280 has had the unfortunate effect of obfuscating the full 
purpose of many initiatives.281 One can easily imagine a voter 
reading the preamble of the initiative at issue in Brosnahan, which 
stated that the proposition was intended “to strengthen procedural 
and substantive safeguards for victims in our criminal justice 
system,”282 and voting for that worthy cause without knowing all of 
the myriad components that may fall under such a generous heading 
or the costs associated with them. 
When confronted with a multifaceted proposition tackling many 
subjects, like those at issue in Brosnahan, the average voter must 
make a series of complex calculations to sufficiently weigh the 
initiative’s pros and cons.283 It is true that every law involves such a 
weighing process,284 but the current single-subject rule only confuses 
that analysis by allowing many different issues to be put to a single 
vote.285 Instead of preserving the initiative power of the people and 
their right to be fully informed before voting, the judicial 
interpretation of the “reasonably germane” standard promotes 
279. See Evans v. Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (Cal. 1932).
280. “[T]he [single-subject] provision is not to receive a narrow or technical construction in
all cases, but is to be construed liberally to uphold proper legislation . . . .” Perry v. Jordan, 207 
P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1948). Much as the California Supreme Court is reluctant to intrude on the
legislative right to legislate, so does the court not wish to impinge on the expressly reserved
legislative power of the electorate. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Cal.
1995).
281. This stands in stark contrast to the single-subject rule’s original purpose—the original
pamphlet describing the proposed single-subject rule in 1948 noted that “[t]he busy voter does not 
have the time to devote to the study of long, wordy, propositions and must rely upon such sketchy 
information as may be received through the press, radio, or picked up in general conversation.” 
CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE, BALLOT PAMPHLET 8 (1948); see supra Part 
III.A.2.a.
282. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 280 (Cal. 1982).
283. Minger, supra note 164, at 909.
284. See Daniel Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 936, 958 (1983) (noting that weighing the positives and negatives of something is “inherent 
in the passage of most laws”). 
285. Minger, supra note 164, at 908–09 (“For example, when multiple subjects are presented
by provisions A, B, and C in a single initiative, the voter cannot merely decide if she likes or 
dislikes provision A or provision B—she must decide if she likes provision A more than she 
dislikes provision B or if she dislikes provision B more than she likes provisions A and C 
combined.”). 
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deception by initiative drafters.286 Far from narrowing an initiative’s 
breadth, this judicial approach encourages drafters to lump dissimilar 
provisions under an uninformative catchphrase.287 Furthermore, it 
allows initiative sponsors to slip in potentially undesired provisions 
that fit under the umbrella term, infringing on a voter’s freedom of 
choice.288 All of these problems go against the spirit of the 
single-subject rule, which directly attempted to avoid the dangers 
inherent in propositions overloaded with separate issues.289 
Despite the obvious difficulty the average voter has in 
accurately digesting modern-day initiatives,290 the California 
Supreme Court seems determined to convince itself that voters are 
well prepared to deal with such multifaceted proposals.291 According 
to the court, so long as an initiative’s provisions are “reasonably 
germane” to one another, there can be no possibility of voter 
confusion.292 To put it lightly, this is a gross overestimation of voter 
knowledge.293 The average voter is exposed only to the official 
materials in the ballot pamphlet and generally has no knowledge of 
the origin or the significance of the language describing an 
initiative’s law.294 Unlike the legislative process, where a bill must 
pass through legislative debate and public hearings before it is 
passed, an initiative does not pass through such a rigorous system: it 
is presented to the voter as is.295 The voter receives a pamphlet 
containing pages and pages of material, usually written by lawyers 
and described in technicalities and with titles that often have little to 
286. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 293–94 (Bird, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 293.
288. Id.
289. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
290. See Araceli MartÃnez Ortega, Busting Through Ballot Confusion in California, NEW
AM. MEDIA (Oct. 24, 2012), http://newamericamedia.org/2012/10/busting-through-ballot 
-confusion-clear-explanations-of-key-cas-initiatives.php.
291. See Uelmen, supra note 166, at 661–62.
292. “Generally, the drafters who frame an initiative statute and the voters who enact it may
be deemed to be aware of the judicial construction of the law that served as its source.” In re 
Harris, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Cal. 1989). “We must assume the voters duly considered and 
comprehended these materials.” Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 32 (Cal. 2002) (quoting 
Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Cal. 1990)). 
293. Stephen H. Sutro, Interpretation of Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Canons
of Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 945, 968 
(1994). 
294. Id.
295. Minger, supra note 164, at 926.
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do with what the initiative actually seeks to achieve.296 For the 
average voter unfamiliar with the intricacies of an initiative, this 
simply is not a practical way to learn enough to make an informed 
decision.297 Voters are not experienced in interpreting the numerous 
proposals that make up a modern initiative in a manner that would 
allow them to avoid confusion.298 They do not have the time or 
resources necessary to devote themselves to studying propositions—
often long, wordy, and containing unfamiliar language.299 This leads 
to initiatives passed without the full understanding of the people who 
passed them.300 
This problem arises from the court’s original error of 
commingling the legislative single-subject rule of Evans with the 
new initiative single-subject rule.301 Simply put, the two are too 
different to be used in the same way.302 The legislative single-subject 
rule has a title requirement; the initiative does not.303 A violation of 
the single-subject rule in the legislature will invalidate the part of a 
bill not covered by the title; a violation in an initiative will void the 
entire proposition.304 The judicial practice of taking the same “canon 
of construction” that embodies the legislative single-subject rule and 
applying it to the initiative single-subject rule assumes that those 
who voted on the initiative single-subject rule knew of the previous 
single-subject rule and had the “intent for uniformity and 
consistency.”305 This presumption ignores the electorate’s reality and 
its limited time to sift through endless, confusingly worded 
paperwork, and assumes their intent for the same standard.306 
Thus, when courts fail to account for how the electorate 
analyzes and understands an initiative’s text and purpose, they also 
fail to account for the electorate’s intent in passing the initiative.307 
296. Ortega, supra note 290.
297. Id.
298. Sutro, supra note 293, at 973.
299. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 281, at 8–9.
300. Uelmen, supra note 166, at 670.
301. Sutro, supra note 293, at 966.
302. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8, with CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
303. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d), with CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
304. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d) (“An initiative measure embracing more than one
subject may not . . . have any effect.”), with CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (“If a statute embraces a 
subject not expressed in its title, only the part not expressed is void.”). 
305. Sutro, supra note 293, at 966.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 971–72.
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The electorate may intend the general purpose without meaning to 
affirm each component part of the initiative.308 This in turn leads to 
further, reckless expansion of government, as voters turn to new 
ballot measures to overcome the unforeseen problems raised by old 
ones.309 Instead of acting as a limit on the draftsmen of initiative 
measures, the single-subject rule has evolved into a phantom 
restriction, one that allows initiative proposals to be presented in a 
format that prevents voters from making fully informed decisions.310 
Until the court adjusts its definition of the “reasonably germane” 
standard, the single-subject rule will remain a toothless constitutional 
relic, one that hardly prevents voters from being misled as to the 
effects of a proposition and subverts the rule’s original purpose.311 
3. The Judiciary’s Heightened Standard of Review for
Legislative Amending of Initiatives Threatens to
Further Marginalize the Legislature’s Power 
The court’s deference to the initiative power and its strict review 
of any legislative statute that attempts to amend an initiative have 
essentially made the electorate’s political power greater than that of 
the legislature.312 By applying a strict standard of review to 
legislative amendments of initiative statutes while retaining only a 
rational basis review of legislative amendments to the legislature’s 
own statutes, the court has made it difficult for the legislature to 
operate effectively or efficiently.313 The legislature is helpless to 
modify initiatives as needed, aside from the strict adherence to the 
“to further the purpose” doctrine.314 The initiative power effectively 
hamstrings the legislative branch of government.315 
The initiative is a political power that is “reserved” by the 
people, not expressly delegated to the people.316 Thus, as a reserved 
308. Id.
309. Ray Ring, Western Voters Love Ballot Initiatives—and Sometimes Make A Mess, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2011, http://www.hcn.org/issues/43.18/western-voters-love-ballot 
-initiatives-and-sometimes-make-a-mess/print_view.
310. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 301 (Cal. 1982) (Bird, J., dissenting).
311. CAL. OFFICE OF SEC’Y OF STATE, BALLOT PAMPHLET 8–9 (1948).
312. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1202.
313. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Top Judge Calls Calif. Government ‘Dysfunctional’, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/us/11calif.html?_r=0. 
314. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 1119–20 (Cal. 1995).
315. Steinhauer, supra note 313.
316. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1; art. IV, § 1 (West, Westlaw through all 2012 Reg. Sess.
laws, Gov. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 2011–2012, and all propositions on 2012 ballots). 
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form of political power, it should be subject to some limits, as is 
every other branch of government.317 For example, the exercise of 
popular sovereignty—best represented in the twin constitutional 
conventions California held in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century—is inherent in the people and allows them to create and 
regulate government institutions.318 The people’s initiative power, on 
the other hand, is a subset of popular sovereignty, not equal to the 
full exercise of political power inherent in a constitutional 
convention but similar to another subset of political power like the 
legislature’s ability to pass bills.319 As such, it should be subject to 
strictly defined limits, as is the government.320 The court’s 
heightened scrutiny under the “further the purpose” standard of 
review for legislative amendments of initiative statutes, even if 
legitimate,321 has essentially made this subset of popular sovereignty 
an overwhelmingly powerful force in California politics, to the 
detriment of the other branches of government.322 In a so-called 
republican system of government, this tremendous deference to the 
exercise of the initiative power veers dangerously close to full-blown 
direct democracy instead of the limited power originally envisioned 
by the constitutional text.323 
Although California has long adhered to the idea that ultimate 
power lies in the people,324 the court’s overriding deference to the 
initiative power and its positioning of this power on a higher plane 
than the legislature’s has blurred the separation of powers essential in 
a republican government.325 Much as the court is within its rights 
when it considers state action and reviews initiatives for 
constitutionality,326 the legislature’s ability to amend legislation—
317. See Ngo, supra note 16, at 260.
318. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1190–92.
319. Id. at 1195.
320. Id. at 1195–96.
321. The judiciary has largely ignored the legislature’s portrayals of whether a legislative
proposal is in fact just another passing of a popularly repealed law or whether a legislative statute 
is or is not an amendment to an initiative. See Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 
1119 (Cal. 1995); Martin v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 307, 311 (1959); Bartosh v. Bd. of Osteopathic 
Exam’rs, 186 P.2d 984, 988 (1947). 
322. Tim Rutten, What’s California’s Problem? Its People, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, http://
articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/14/opinion/oe-rutten14. 
323. See infra Part III.B.
324. See supra Part II.
325. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1202–06.
326. Ngo, supra note 16, at 264.
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whether passed by itself or by the people—should fall within its 
rights as the legislative branch.327 
The obeisance to the initiative at the expense of the legislature 
has created a dysfunctional government environment in which 
special interest-funded initiative measures have changed much of the 
structure of the constitution and the state’s laws, doing away with 
legislative fact-finding and deliberation.328 In 2012, eleven 
propositions made it to the California ballot.329 Four of them were 
largely funded by wealthy individuals, while others were primarily 
challenged by wealthy critics with millions of dollars worth of 
advertising at their command.330 Although the financial elite have 
always had a hand in initiatives, they are now involving themselves 
in greater numbers and with a broader resource base than ever 
before, building coalitions that increase the chances that their 
initiatives will be passed; thus, small groups play an outsized role in 
setting government policy.331 Given the marginalizing of the 
legislature by the initiative process and the increasing role wealthy 
interests play in initiative campaigns, it does not seem unrealistic to 
believe a return to the age where special interests controlled 
government—the same age that necessitated the initiative itself—is 
possible and even likely.332 
4. The Initiative Has Deviated from
Its Original Purpose 
The court’s haphazard interpretation of various rules has ignored 
one of the original purposes of the initiative—to defeat legislative 
congestion—and has instead transformed the initiative process into 
its own sort of legislative blockage.333 The ballot initiative as 
envisioned by the Progressive movement looked to defeat the 
hamstringing of legislatures by powerful special interest groups such 
327. Id. at 264–65.
328. Steinhauer, supra note 313.
329. Normitsu Onishi, California Ballot Initiatives, Born in Populism, Now Come From
Billionaires, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/us/politics 
/california-ballot-initiatives-dominated-by-the-very-rich.html?pagewanted=all. 
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Rutten, supra note 322.
798 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:755 
as the Southern Pacific Railroad.334 The current, barely regulated 
initiative system, however, has created a political environment where 
nearly any kind of initiative can be proposed, voted on, and defended 
with ease.335 
This kind of system has perverted the initiative process from its 
original status as a “legislative battering ram”336 and a tool initially 
aimed at controlling special interests.337 Now, the initiative process 
itself may hinder the legislature from legislating effectively, and the 
same kinds of powerful special interests that once dominated 
legislative processes are now in charge of the initiative.338 The 
sizable influence of special interest groups able to fund and 
campaign for initiatives has created a system of dysfunctional 
overuse of the initiative system.339 Individual donors have been 
contributing for and against various initiative measures with tens of 
millions of dollars, amounts usually reserved for companies and 
political action committees (“PACs”).340 Consumer Watchdog 
president Jamie Court remarked, “Hiram Johnson would probably be 
turning over in his grave.”341 At this point, the initiative process in 
California is a corruption of what the Progressives intended when 
they instituted the initiative system.342 
334. See Final Talk Made by the Governor, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 8, 1911, at 57;
see also Manheim, supra note 11, at 1185–88 (describing the political situation and 
pseudo-“Banana Republic” atmosphere that existed in California and directly led to the adoption 
of the initiative). 
335. Lisa Pampuch, Ballot-box Budgeting Just the Beginning of California’s Initiative Woes,
MY POINT EXACTLY (Apr. 24, 2012), http://mypointexactly.wordpress.com/2012/04/24/ballot 
-box-budgeting-just-the-beginning-of-californias-initiative-woes/.
336. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281,1289 (Cal. 1978). 
337. See supra Part II.B.
338. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1190 (“Southern Pacific Railroad—the target of the
1911 initiative process—has recently sponsored its own ballot measures.”). 
339. Aaron Sankin, Prop 39: Bringing Jobs Into California Or More Ballot Box Budgeting?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/prop-39-brining 
-jobs-into_n_1990232.html.
340. The 2012 California ballot had more millionaire and billionaire wealth behind it than any
other ballot in history. Onishi, supra note 329. One example is hedge-fund billionaire Tom 
Steyer, who contributed $21 million of his own money in support of Proposition 39 in 2012. 
Sankin, supra note 339. 
341. Onishi, supra note 329.
342. Rutten, supra note 322; see also CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 22, in CALIFORNIA 
BALLOT PAMPHLET, SPECIAL ELECTION (Oct. 11, 1911) (Comments of Lee C. Gates, Senator, 
34th District, and William C. Clark, Assemblyman, 59th District) (describing how opponents of 
the initiative will likely be “servants of special interests” and those who scoff at the idea of 
self-government). 
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The ease of placing initiatives on the ballot, plus lax limitations 
by the courts, has resulted in an environment where one merely 
“needs money, not a good idea”343 Persistently low voter turnouts 
usually mean that measures rise or fall based on a relatively small 
number of votes, which in turn allows sponsors to fashion shrewdly 
targeted advertising campaigns to encourage their measures’ 
passage.344 This has led to what former Oregon Attorney General 
Dave Frohnmayer called “tribal politics,” which are based upon 
fundamentally undemocratic, sectarian ideals and rooted “in the 
exploitation of divisions of class, cash, gender, region, ethnicity, 
morality, and ideology—a give-no-quarter and take-no-prisoners 
activism that demands satisfaction and accepts no compromise.”345 
It is important to make a distinction between these collective 
passions, perhaps rooted in racial or sexual prejudices, and what 
eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume called the “passion of 
interest,”346 or a universal “love of gain” to further the benefit of all a 
government’s citizens.347 A passion of interest had a well-defined 
economic meaning in Hume’s time,348 while collective passions built 
on ethnic loyalties, or by religious and moral outrage, “divide ‘us’ 
from ‘them’ without any personal target.”349 Now, those “passions of 
interest” can be subverted and used by a majoritarian voting bloc to 
343. Jessica Levinson, Ballot Initiatives Have Harmed California, KCET (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.kcet.org/updaily/socal_focus/commentary/would-you-like-to-save-california.html. 
Signature-gathering has become a commercial enterprise as well—competition to get a superior 
service is high, with signatures sometimes coming in at three dollars each. Nannette Miranda, 
Signature Gathering Gets Costly for Tax Initiative, KGO-TV NEWS (Mar. 19, 2012), http:// 
abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/politics&id=8587347. This has led to citizen initiatives, 
once a volunteer event, becoming “hijacked” by groups with $2 or $4 million to spend on their 
own concerns. Id. For the average citizen, getting a measure on the ballot is close to impossible. 
Id. This has also led signature-gathering companies to forsake potentially less-funded statewide 
petitions in favor of more lucrative local ballot petitions that may pay a premium for signatures. 
Joe Mathews, Price of Ballot Initiative Signatures Plummets, NBC SAN DIEGO (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://www.nbcsandiego.com/blogs/prop-zero/Petitions-Circulators-Signatures-Gatherers-Ballot 
-Initiatives-Measures-Taxes-Budget-Green-Energy-138810329.html.
344. Id.
345. Dave Frohnmayer, The New Tribalism, OLD OREGON, Autumn 1992, at 16.
346. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not ‘Republican Government’: The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 32 (1993). 
347. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 1878).
348. See FELIX RAAB, THE ENGLISH FACE OF MACHIAVELLI 237 (1964); see also GARRY 
WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 83–86, 190–92 (1981) (explaining the 
difference and semantics of economic passions of interest and individual “passions” like pride 
and ambition). 
349. Linde, supra note 346, at 32.
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deprive others of their fundamental rights based on a certain social 
prejudice, allowing various factions to divide “us” from “them” with 
relative ease.350 If the initiative system is expected to operate as it 
was intended to in our republican government, its validity depends 
on its ability to avoid the kind of misuse that deliberative institutions 
like the legislature were meant to protect.351 
5. The Initiative’s Harmful “Ballot Box Budgeting” Effect
The California Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the
initiative power, and significant deference to its use, has complicated 
not only the state’s political process but also its fiscal situation.352 
The ease with which an initiative can be drafted, sponsored, 
campaigned for, and passed, along with the strong safeguards against 
intervention by the executive or legislative branches, have made 
“ballot box budgeting” an all-too-easy quick fix to California’s 
budget problems—fixes that, more often than not, lead to more 
problems.353 
A short explanation of ballot box budgeting is in order. Until 
very recently,354 California, unlike most states, required a 
supermajority before the legislature could pass a budget.355 This 
made it exceedingly difficult for a majority party to get the amount 
of concessions and agreements necessary to pass a budget plan.356 
Predictably, this ponderous process frustrated California voters, 
leading many to turn to the initiative power to tackle budget 
problems—even after the supermajority requirement was 
eliminated.357 Voters are able to pass a budget via an initiative with 
350. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 600–01.
351. Linde, supra note 346, at 34.
352. Pampuch, supra note 335.
353. Jessica A. Levinson, Ballot Box Budgeting in California: The Bane of the Golden State
or an Overstated Problem?, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 693 (2010). 
354. Voters changed the supermajority requirement in 2010. Anthony York, Voters Pass
Prop. 25, Allowing Legislative Majority Vote to Pass California Budget, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 
2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2010/11/voters-pass-prop-25-allowing 
-legislative-majority-vote-to-pass-california-budget.html.
355. Supermajority Vote Requirements to Pass the Budget: A Legisbrief, NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/supermajority 
-vote-requirements-to-pass-the-budget.aspx. Only Arkansas and Rhode Island have a
supermajority requirement for the passage of a budget. Levinson, supra note 353, at 691. The
population of both states combined is about 3.8 million—California’s equals about 37 million. Id.
356. Id.
357. Of the states that allow some sort of initiative process, less than half permit budgeting by
initiative. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN THE 
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only a simple majority, as with any other initiative.358 This process, 
called “ballot box budgeting,” has hampered the legislature by 
undermining the regular budget process and substituting a process 
that aims to do well but instead, often makes things worse.359 What 
was once solely “the work of elected officials who have the benefit 
of hearings, staff analysis and institutional memory has been given to 
voters to make what is tantamount to a snap decision.”360 
Proposition 98 is a good example. That successful measure on 
the November 1988 ballot required that a certain minimum 
percentage of the state budget be spent on public education, 
essentially mandating an increase in education spending.361 The 
mandatory spending floor placed enormous pressure on all other 
facets of the state budget, from the prisons to the courts.362 The 
initiative happened to pass at a moment when California was 
generating unexpectedly high tax revenues.363 $1 billion of this extra 
income, which the legislature might have channeled into the areas 
where it was most needed, was instead completely allocated to 
education.364 Whether a given allocation of funds makes sense or not 
at the time it passes, codifying budgeting decisions in this way 
effectively cripples the legislature’s ability to adjust for future 
changes—which is exactly what happened when the next recession 
hit the state’s underfunded reserves.365 As one would expect, 
budgetary issues like these caused by initiatives have put California 
21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCSL I&R TASK FORCE, 17–
20 (July 2002), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR_rep
ort.pdf. 
358. Levinson, supra note 353, at 692.
359. Pampuch, supra note 335.
360. Id.
361. California Proposition 98, Mandatory Education Spending (1988), BALLOTPEDIA
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_98,_Mandatory 
_Education_Spending_(1988). 
362. Kevin O’Leary, How the Initiative Culture Broke California, TIME (Feb. 26, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1968141,00.html. 
363. “In a nutshell: Prop 98 ties school funding, in part, to year-to-year changes in state
revenue. But the year-to-year changes projected by this year’s budget deal ended up being wrong, 
making it seem as though revenues are growing faster than projected, thus guaranteeing schools 
more money.” John Myers, $21 Billion Deficit Now, Worse Later, KQED (Nov. 18, 2009), 
http://blogs.kqed.org/capitalnotes/2009/11/18/21-billion-deficit-now-worse-later/. 
364. Id.
365. Id.
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in an increasingly “tightening straitjacket” of its people’s own 
making.366 
The inability of a vast body like the electorate to collectively 
implement a rational financial plan has made it difficult for the 
legislature to budget properly, either by tying up sizable portions of 
the budget or by making it difficult to properly allocate funds in a 
shifting economic climate.367 The average voter is likely unaware of 
the full consequences of such initiatives, which are often marketed to 
voters in ways that emphasize limited tax impacts or their mandates 
to spend on worthy subjects like education, and not their overall 
fiscal impact.368 This has led to a pervasive attitude of “something 
for nothing,”369 where voters feel compelled to vote for measures 
they believe will benefit them with no explanation of how the 
propositions’ potential costs will be funded.370 
An example of this is Proposition 37. This failed 2012 initiative 
attempted to mandate certain labeling and advertising procedures for 
genetically modified food.371 Its fiscal impact was described in 
vague, simplistic terms, with an indeterminate explanation of 
costs.372 According to the proposition’s sponsors, annual state costs 
for the regulation of labels for genetically engineered foods were 
estimated to rise anywhere from a few hundred thousand dollars to 
over $1 million.373 The sponsors acknowledged potential costs to 
state and local governments for litigation-related expenses arising 
from violations of the measure.374 However, the proposition 
suggested, also in vague terms, that such violations might pay for 
366. O’Leary, supra note 362.
367. See Levinson, supra note 353, at 696–97; see also William M. Lunch, Budgeting by
Initiative: An Oxymoron, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 663, 669 (1998) (describing the difficulty for 
legislators in balancing the competing interests of various initiative measures with the need to 
create a balanced state budget); Kevin O’Leary, The Citizen Assembly: An Alternative to the 
Initiative, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1489, 1491–92 (2007) (“[T]he biggest negative is the cumulative 
effect of ballot measures—some of them constitutional amendments nearly cast in stone—that 
severely hamstring state legislators and governors from doing their jobs.”). 
368. Ring, supra note 309.
369. Interview with Joe Matthews, Writer, L.A. TIMES, in L.A., Cal. (Oct. 17, 2012).
370. A summary of Proposition 37’s estimated fiscal impact on state and local government
indicates “increased annual state costs ranging from a few hundred thousand dollars to over $1 
million to regulate the labeling of genetically engineered foods,” plus additional potential costs to 
state and local governments due to litigation arising under possible violations of the law. Id. 
371. California Proposition 37, Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Food (2012).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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themselves, thanks to court filing fees required of each party filing in 
the case.375 
This problem highlights a major difference between the 
lawmaking power of the legislature and that of the electorate: the 
popular vote does not go through the same mechanisms of hearings, 
committee studies, amendments, and compromises that constitute the 
safeguards of a diverse, deliberative legislature.376 This is 
particularly relevant in an area like the budget, where legislators 
often must anticipate how one part of a budget may affect another; 
voters, in contrast, are more likely to see each measure in a 
vacuum.377 This essential difference highlights the fundamental flaw 
in ballot-box budgeting and is indicative of the larger problem: using 
the unrestricted initiative power in an attempt to fix problems that 
would be better served by a more deliberative governing process. 
B. The Initiative’s Form of Direct Democracy
Threatens to Subvert Our Republican Government 
If both direct democracy and republicanism have a place in 
California government, then the distinctions and relationship 
between the two should be pronounced and easily discernible. As it 
stands now, they are not.378 The electorate’s increasing power thanks 
to the court’s loose refereeing of the initiative system essentially 
places the people’s initiative power on a higher plane than that of the 
other branches of government, beyond the reach of the traditional 
system of checks and balances.379 
Republicanism’s role as a bulwark for minority rights is one of 
its shining characteristics.380 The California Supreme Court’s 
decisions, however, most notably Strauss, have eroded that 
bulwark.381 Reading the revision-amendment distinction narrowly so 
as to “subject[] minority rights to a nondeliberative bare majority 
vote” goes against the very principles California was founded on, 
subverting republican values with the worst traits of direct 
375. Id.
376. Linde, supra note 346, at 34.
377. Levinson, supra note 353, at 699.
378. Hans A. Linde, Practicing Theory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative Lawmaking, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1735, 1755 (1998). 
379. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 606–09.
380. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 123 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin
Books 1987). 
381. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 140 (Cal. 2009) (Moreno, J., dissenting).
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democracy.382 In a representative system of government, the 
principles of separation of powers, bicameralism, and veto powers, 
among others, prevent majority rule from becoming majority 
tyranny.383 Normally, judicial review would serve as an appropriate 
check on direct democracy.384 The court’s failure to appropriately 
protect minority rights—as in Strauss with a strict judicial review of 
Proposition 8’s effects—upsets the careful balance between 
republicanism and direct democracy in California, tilting the scale 
dangerously in favor of direct majoritarian rule.385 
The Progressives who instituted the ballot initiative believed that 
the ostensibly conflicting ideals of republicanism and direct 
democracy could coexist, seeing direct legislation as “a structural 
improvement on representative government . . . [that would] fight 
and confound special interest.”386 Those same Progressives would no 
doubt be surprised, however, by how that spirit of careful, thoughtful 
community action has been corrupted by the modern-day ballot 
initiative in California. Voters may have only a few months, at most, 
to learn of and educate themselves about an upcoming initiative.387 
The most common medium through which a voter can gather 
information about an initiative is through the corporate media, which 
likely have their own biases and agendas.388 The average voter will 
likely not be engaged in exchanges of information with her neighbors 
or be required to listen to the arguments of those who hold opposing 
views or give reasons for her own position.389 Those who are more 
familiar than most with the minute details and pros and cons of an 
initiative are likely to have gained that information by themselves or 
through informal networks of similarly situated family and friends.390 
382. Equal Protection, supra note 222, at 1522.
383. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 604.
384. Id. at 609.
385. See id. at 604.
386. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 599.
387. The Secretary of State must place a qualifying initiative on the ballot as long as there are
at least 131 days before the date of the next general election. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(c). 
388. Smith, supra note 23, at 572.
389. Id. Nor will they be required to read the text of the initiative itself, nor its title and
summary, nor the pro and con arguments contained in the voting materials. E-mail from Karl M. 
Manheim, Professor of Law, Loyola Law Sch., to author (Jan. 25, 2013, 4:44 PM) (on file with 
author). The idea that voters are fully informed on the issues is an outdated and idealized notion 
that likely hasn’t existed since the eighteenth-century New England town halls. Id. 
390. Id.
Spring 2015] CALIFORNIA’S INITIATIVE PROCESS 805 
When it comes time to decide on a ballot measure, California 
voters can vote “yes,” vote “no,” or stay home and ignore the issue 
entirely.391 This is a far cry from the spirit of community action 
“resulting in analysis and deduction”392 that the Progressives 
imagined, and it stands in stark contrast to the Jeffersonian model of 
convention, where speakers may “convey the nuances of their 
position, the order of their preferences, and their emerging support 
for alternative proposals.”393 In private, individuals’ prejudices are 
more easily acted on than in an open, public environment like a 
representative congress.394 This creates an environment where it is 
easy for initiatives to succeed on the basis of class, money, gender, 
locale, morality, and ethnicities—indeed, the majority of initiatives 
are used to enact views based on those criteria.395 As initiatives 
proliferate and the judiciary’s reluctance to impose meaningful 
restrictions on the initiative power grows, the electorate’s power 
increases at the expense of the legislature.396 
What Strauss has created—and what the court’s broad 
interpretation of the initiative power may lead to in the future—is 
law that undermines the very first sentence of the California 
Constitution: “All people are by nature free and independent and 
have inalienable rights.”397 This outcome, too, conflicts with the 
Jeffersonian ideal of direct democracy, in which the majority would 
not have the ability to pass any law that would fundamentally 
reshape the social contract and infringe on an individual’s rights.398 
By allowing a bare majority of the electorate to circumvent the 
normal constraints of republicanism that would have surely defeated 
a measure such as the one at issue in Strauss,399 the current initiative 
system “invites appeals to private prejudices that are denied and 
disclaimed in an open or representative process.”400 While the 
Progressives created the initiative to serve an ideal of an interested 
citizenry that had the inclination and time to continuously participate 
391. Id.
392. Bourne, supra note 78, at 11.
393. Smith, supra note 23, at 572.
394. Linde, supra note 378, at 1744.
395. Id. at 1738–39.
396. Id. at 1737.
397. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
398. JEFFERSON, supra note 72, at 189.
399. In fact, it already did. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 384 (Cal. 2008).
400. Linde, supra note 378, at 1744.
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in politics and lawmaking, without regard for self-interest,401 most 
individual voters who participate in the initiative process are 
eminently self-interested.402 Nevertheless, courts continue to 
interpret the initiative power as generously as possible, allowing 
prejudiced views to dominate without any sort of inhibition at the 
ballot box.403 “The self-selected private lawmakers are ‘the least 
accountable branch’ . . . free by design to make law in ‘ignorance 
and self-deception.’”404 This is just what James Madison and other 
Federalists feared most about direct democracy.405 
A proper democratic society must be able to strike a careful 
balance between a process that permits amendments reasonable in 
their scope and effect, without becoming so permissive as to be 
susceptible to incessant propositions threatening the social 
contract.406 Doing so would help prevent individuals, minority or 
otherwise, from being deprived of their rights.407 If a state is going to 
allow a form of direct democracy to constitute a major part of the 
legislative process, that allowance must limit measures motivated by 
reasons abhorred and feared by those who designed a republican 
form of government.408 Strauss instead threatens to send California 
down a path where direct majoritarian power overwhelms that of the 
original republican government.409 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
An examination of the California Supreme Court’s rulings over 
the years and the overwhelming power the initiative system has 
gained in twenty-first-century California makes it clear that our state 
system of direct democracy threatens to overwhelm the ideal of 
republican government enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.410 Strauss 
demonstrates that California’s lack of procedural or subject-matter 
401. Id. at 1739–40.
402. For example, there is a crucial difference between voting to reduce taxes on your
constituent base and voting to reduce taxes on yourself. Id. at 1742. 
403. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 138–40 (Cal. 2009) (Moreno, J., dissenting).
404. Linde, supra note 378, at 1744.
405. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin
Books 1987). 
406. Smith, supra note 23, at 576.
407. Id.
408. Linde, supra note 346, at 21.
409. See Ngo, supra note 16, at 245–48.
410. See supra Part III.B.
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limitations may even cause conflicts with the U.S. Constitution’s 
basic federal rights and recognized suspect classes.411 Our initiative 
system is both extremely powerful and extremely inflexible—
limiting its power while increasing its flexibility is the only way to 
return California’s ballot initiative process to a level commensurate 
with republican tripartite government and the legislature’s own 
power. A stricter pre-election review; a more stringent 
revision-amendment distinction; the potential involvement of the 
legislature; a deliberative, longer initiative process; and a sharper line 
limiting what the electorate can accomplish through the initiative 
process can help establish a clearer border between the reach of the 
electorate’s power and that of the legislature.412 
A. The Court Should Cast Aside Its Preference for Using
Technical, Formalistic Rules in Isolation, as It Did in Strauss 
The “qualitative” prong of the revision-amendment distinction 
should be more strictly construed; if there is any doubt that an 
initiative is a revision, it should be struck down. This will prevent 
any questionable amendments that on the surface may present only a 
few lines’ worth of change to the California Constitution, but in 
effect could abridge a fundamental, protected right or impinge on the 
rights of a protected suspect class. The judiciary’s role in protecting 
minority rights would be better served with a more expansive reading 
of California precedent so as to define fundamental rights like equal 
protection and due process as essential components of the structure 
or framework of government.413 Indeed, Justice Werdegar’s 
revision-amendment standard from her concurrence in Strauss 
articulated such an idea.414 The court would be better served by 
classifying any measure, however narrow, that discriminates against 
a minority group in any way as a revision of the foundational 
principle of equal protection.415 
411. Ngo, supra note 16, at 269; see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (dealing
with a controversial California initiative—Proposition 14—that permitted racial discrimination in 
housing and was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as encouraging discrimination and thus 
violating a basic federal right). 
412. See infra Part IV.A–B.
413. Equal Protection, supra note 222, at 1516.
414. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 124 (Cal. 2009) (Werdegar, J., concurring).
415. Equal Protection, supra note 222, at 1521.
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Similarly, by applying a new perspective on the single-subject 
rule’s “reasonably germane” standard, the number of frivolous, 
logrolling initiatives may be reduced while clearing up issues of 
voter confusion.416 Specifically, if there is a question as to whether a 
measure’s provisions align under the “reasonably germane” standard, 
the court should favor a narrow construction rather than a liberal one 
that may implicate a whole variety of laws under a general, catchall 
term.417 An initiative should not be passed simply because its drafters 
were able to come up with a name broad enough to feasibly 
encompass all of the initiative’s various sections.418 Although 
decades of precedent buttress the current “reasonably germane” 
standard, by construing an initiative more narrowly the court will not 
be in danger of prohibiting “the sovereign people from either 
expressing or implementing their own will on matters of such direct 
and immediate importance to them. . . .”419 Instead, the court will be 
supporting the expression and implementation of the people’s will by 
construing initiatives as closely as possible to how they were 
presented to the voters, rather than allowing the people to be fooled 
by vague terms like “criminal justice” and “advertising.”420 
While it would be inefficient to expect the court to look at each 
initiative that comes before it on a case-by-case basis, more 
pre-election review would cut down on the number of potentially 
unconstitutional initiatives before they are presented to the voters 
and discussed by the electorate. There is a potential “ripeness” 
problem in such reviews—a valid concern that a claim based on an 
anticipated future injury should not be reviewed.421 If an initiative 
has not yet been passed by the voters or not even presented to them 
(and may eventually be voted down), then courts will likely be wary 
of reviewing the issue.422 
This argument likely would have arisen if Proposition 8 had 
been reviewed before its enactment. If the constitutional amendment 
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying had not yet passed, then 
416. Minger, supra note 164, at 928–30.
417. Id. at 928.
418. Id. at 929.
419. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 281 (Cal. 1982).
420. Minger, supra note 164, at 929.
421. Ngo, supra note 16, at 267.
422. Id.
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how could they have suffered an injury from it?423 However, as the 
initiative process stood in 2008, a bare majority was permitted to 
strip away a fundamental right via a constitutional amendment.424 
Thus, the process of amending the California Constitution to permit 
something like that creates “a proximate, real-world link between 
California’s constitutional amendment process and the resulting 
harm on gay men and lesbians.”425 Looking at the initiative process 
itself as a potential source of harm, rather than merely at the 
amendment language, can help solve any ripeness issues for those 
looking for more pre-election review of initiative statutes that may 
toe the line of certain initiative restrictions like the 
revision-amendment distinction.426 
B. The Initiative Power Should Be Modified
to Clearly Delineate the Lines Between
Republicanism and Direct Democracy
The structure of the initiative should be modified to further the 
overriding purpose of dividing constitutional power between the 
people and the legislature, making sure to delineate clear and sharp 
lines between the conflicting ideas of republicanism and direct 
democracy. One way to make this happen is to change the format of 
an initiative to require the input of the legislature before initiatives 
go to a popular vote.427 The state of Massachusetts uses an indirect 
initiative process for its constitutional amendments.428 In order to 
amend the state constitution, an amendment must be supported by a 
quarter of the legislature at two constitutional conventions, which are 
simply joint meetings of the state’s House of Representatives and 
Senate.429 The first convention may modify the amendment via a 
three-fourths vote, while the second convention cannot modify the 
amendment at all.430 
An example of this process in action occurred in 2004, when a 
Massachusetts group attempted to amend the state constitution to ban 
423. Id.
424. Id. at 268–69.
425. Id. at 269.
426. Id.
427. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 615–16.
428. Id. at 613.
429. Id.
430. MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, § 4.
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same-sex marriage.431 Although the amendment passed the first 
convention, it failed 157 votes to 39 in the second.432 This is a fine 
example of the citizens of a state attempting to amend its constitution 
but failing after sufficient time had passed.433 This additional time 
between meetings allowed for a proper amount of deliberation and 
discussion regarding the amendment and led to involved legislators 
finding it antithetical to the rights of a minority group.434 Involving 
the state legislature in an amendment ensures that any change to the 
state’s constitution is carefully reviewed and openly debated.435 This 
is preferable to voters having to deal with a firestorm of conflicting 
media campaigns preceding an instantaneous decision on election 
day, made in the secrecy of a voting booth.436 This “sober second 
thought”437 is just the kind of meticulous, reasoned approach that 
Jefferson advocated in his vision of direct democracy and the 
opposite of what often occurs in California’s hyperactive initiative 
process.438 
Alternatively, California could require a longer delay between 
the time a proposal is first proposed and the time it finally comes to a 
vote.439 In this system, the electorate could debate the issue, much as 
the legislature debates the issue under the Massachusetts system.440 
In June 2011, Oregon became the first state to pass an innovative 
process called “Citizens’ Initiative Review,” in which a citizen panel 
of eighteen to twenty-four people meets for a week, hears testimony 
on all sides of a measure, summarizes it, and then writes both a pro 
argument and a con argument.441 This allows more time for debate 
and discussion between an initiative’s becoming eligible and the 
election, as opposed to the rapid, 131-day minimum turnaround in 
431. Raphael Lewis, After Vote, Both Sides in Debate Energized, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 15,
2005, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/09/15/after_vote_both 
_sides_in_debate_energized. 
432. Id.
433. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 615
434. Id.
435. Ngo, supra note 16, at 271.
436. Id.
437. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 611, 615.
438. See Smith, supra note 23, at 572.
439. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 615.
440. Id. at 613–14.
441. See Ore. House Bill 2643, available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/11reg/measpdf/hb2600
.dir/hb2634.en.pdf. 
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California.442 While this is a good move to a more involved, open, 
direct democracy, it should be only the first step in a movement 
designed to build a more deliberate infrastructure for the initiative 
process. 
While the Oregon system simply allows citizens’ voices to be 
heard, allowing those same citizens to propose alternatives to the 
initiative would present more options and greater opportunities for 
debate.443 The initiative scheme in place in Switzerland, widely 
regarded as the birthplace of the initiative, uses such a process to 
give voters choices beyond a simple “yes” or “no” at the polls.444 
Like the Massachusetts system, the Swiss initiative structure is 
indirect, requiring an initiative to be presented to the Federal 
Assembly (the Swiss version of Congress), which then determines 
whether the measure is valid and whether the assembly supports it.445 
If the assembly supports the initiative, the initiative is presented to 
the electorate for a vote; if the assembly does not, however, both the 
initiative and a counter-draft designed by the Federal Assembly are 
placed on the ballot and the electorate may vote on which one they 
prefer.446 
These institutional safeguards do allow the Swiss legislature to 
impede the initiative process, oftentimes slowing an initiative’s 
passage by several years.447 Only about 10 percent of initiatives that 
make it to the ballot are accepted by both the people and the 
legislature.448 However, using this same counter-draft proposal—not 
with the California legislature but with a panel of California citizens, 
along the lines of Oregon’s system—would permit differing 
viewpoints to be heard without the potential prohibitive influence of 
the legislature.449 This would increase the opportunity for 
deliberation as well as the time between the creation of an initiative 
442. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 615.
443. See Ore. House Bill 2643, available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/11reg/measpdf/hb2600
.dir/hb2634.en.pdf. 
444. JOHN M. ALLSWANG, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 3 (Stanford
Univ. Press 2000). 
445. See MICHAEL GALLAGHER & PIER VINCENZO ULERI, THE REFERENDUM EXPERIENCE
IN EUROPE 188 (MacMillan Press Ltd. 1996). 
446. Id. A similar system is in place in Washington State. See Direct Democracy: The
Initiative and Referendum Process in Washington, THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF 
WASHINGTON ED. FUND, (Oct. 2002), http://www.lwvwa.org/pdfs/studies/init-ref-study.pdf. 
447. See GALLAGHER & ULERI, supra note 445, at 188.
448. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 611.
449. Id.
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and the election.450 The debate between opponents and proponents of 
a measure would create mediating stages that might prevent extreme 
proposals from winning a majority vote.451 The Swiss initiative 
system imposes another burden by requiring a double-majority vote 
for an initiative to pass into law.452 
Other states have instituted subject-matter restrictions that limit 
what an initiative can propose.453 As the Strauss court pointed out, 
there are currently no such limitations on the type of constitutional 
amendments that can be proposed or what sections of the state 
constitution are off-limits to amendment.454 The initiative power 
should be amended to add subject-matter restrictions, thus forbidding 
any constitutional amendment that could conceivably affect a basic 
federal right or impinge on a federally protected suspect class such as 
homosexuals.455 California could also maintain the current 
subject-matter standard and add a heightened voting requirement for 
initiatives that amend the actual constitution, much as the Swiss 
system requires.456 By leaving a bare majority vote in place for 
initiative legislation, and imposing a greater majority approval for 
initiatives proposing constitutional amendments, the initiative will 
still be a powerful tool of legislation for the electorate, but California 
Constitution—the foundation of the state’s government—will 
become more stable and harder to change.457 
C. The Proposed Changes Will Not
Subvert the People’s Initiative Power
When California first drafted its constitution in 1849, it required 
a majority of each house of the legislature to concur on a proposed 
amendment in two separate legislative sessions before the 
amendment could be submitted to the voters.458 The changes 
450. See id. at 611–12.
451. Id. at 611.
452. A double-majority vote requires a majority of the population and a majority of the
cantons (the Swiss counterpart to a state). GALLAGHER & ULERI, supra note 445, at 188. 
453. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 108–09 (Cal. 2009) (using the constitutions of
Massachusetts and Mississippi as examples of voter initiatives that prohibit constitutional 
amendments that affect rights contained in the state’s bill of rights). 
454. Id. at 109–10.
455. Ngo, supra note 16, at 270.
456. See GALLAGHER & ULERI, supra note 445, at 188.
457. Ngo, supra note 16, at 270–71.
458. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 80–81 (2009).
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proposed above will not return California to its roots, where passing 
a constitutional amendment was a rigorous and slow process that 
barely involved the people.459 None of these proposals will take 
away the precious initiative power that, despite its many problems, 
has afforded so much positive growth and change in California’s 
society and government.460 What these changes will do is engender a 
spirit of reflection, accountability, and sober, reasoned discussion 
when it comes to changing the California Constitution.461 These 
changes will also return the initiative to a level where the electorate’s 
legislative power is commensurate with that of the legislature, and 
the lines between direct democracy and republicanism are clearly set 
and defined.462 
V. CONCLUSION
As it stands now, California’s ballot initiative process faces very 
little effective regulation from the courts, despite the enumerated 
restrictions ostensibly designed to limit the people’s power.463 The 
California Supreme Court’s distinction between what constitutes a 
revision and what constitutes an amendment is needlessly narrow, 
endangering fundamental principles of our government, such as 
equal protection, and opening up the door for future restriction of 
essential rights by a majoritarian group.464 The court’s interpretation 
of the single-subject rule’s “reasonably germane” standard has 
reduced the rule to something initiative drafters pay lip service to, 
increasing voter confusion and increasing the number of bloated, 
convoluted initiatives.465 The court’s heightened standard of review 
of legislative amendments modifying initiative statutes has firmly 
established the electorate on a level above that of the legislature and 
hampered the legislature’s ability to edit bills for efficiency, 
budgetary considerations, or other important governmental 
459. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1184–85.
460. The initiative process in California has shepherded numerous progressive reforms as
well as social and cultural ones over the years, particularly in the field of labor—eight-hour work 
days for women, restrictions on child labor, and the establishment of an Industrial Accident Board 
have all come about from the initiative process. RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: 
THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 187 (Univ. Press of Kan. 2002). 
461. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 616.
462. See Linde, supra note 378, at 1760.
463. See supra Part II.C.1–3.
464. See supra Part III.A.1.
465. See supra Part III.A.2.
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concerns.466 Furthermore, issues arising from the proliferation of 
initiatives, such as ballot box budgeting, have only continued to 
hamstring the effective functioning of government.467 Finally, the 
original aims of the initiative have been corrupted by the court’s 
passive enforcement of its own various rules, creating a system of 
majoritarian direct democracy that threatens to subvert our 
constitutionally mandated republican government.468 
A stricter consideration of the revision-amendment distinction, a 
more lenient standard of pre-election review, greater involvement 
and collaboration with the legislature, allowing proposal alternatives, 
and potentially instituting a double-majority voting system or 
subject-matter restrictions, would all contribute to the goal of 
returning the initiative to the role that its originators intended.469 
Until Californians provide for an initiative process that enhances 
rather than subverts rational, deliberative thought and discussion, 
there will be no way to rein in California’s initiative process and 
maintain the necessary balance between direct democracy and 
republicanism. 
466. See supra Part III.A.3.
467. See supra Part III.A.5.
468. See supra Part III.A.4, Part III.B.
469. See supra Part IV.
